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Comprehensive analysis of Responsible Scaling Policies showing 20 companies with published frameworks as of Dec 2025, with SaferAI grading major policies 1.9-2.2/5 for specificity. Evidence suggests moderate effectiveness hindered by voluntary nature, competitive pressure among 3+ labs, and ~7-month capability doubling potentially outpacing evaluation science, though third-party verification (METR evaluated 5+ models) and Seoul Summit commitments (16 signatories) represent meaningful coordination progress.
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Responsible Scaling Policies
Policy
Responsible Scaling Policies
Comprehensive analysis of Responsible Scaling Policies showing 20 companies with published frameworks as of Dec 2025, with SaferAI grading major policies 1.9-2.2/5 for specificity. Evidence suggests moderate effectiveness hindered by voluntary nature, competitive pressure among 3+ labs, and ~7-month capability doubling potentially outpacing evaluation science, though third-party verification (METR evaluated 5+ models) and Seoul Summit commitments (16 signatories) represent meaningful coordination progress.
AnthropicOrganizationAnthropicComprehensive profile of Anthropic, founded in 2021 by seven former OpenAI researchers (Dario and Daniela Amodei, Chris Olah, Tom Brown, Jack Clark, Jared Kaplan, Sam McCandlish) with early funding...OpenAIOrganizationOpenAIComprehensive organizational profile of OpenAI documenting evolution from 2015 non-profit to commercial AGI developer, with detailed analysis of governance crisis, safety researcher exodus (75% of ...Google DeepMindOrganizationGoogle DeepMindComprehensive overview of DeepMind's history, achievements (AlphaGo, AlphaFold with 200M+ protein structures), and 2023 merger with Google Brain. Documents racing dynamics with OpenAI and new Front...Quality: 37/100METROrganizationMETRMETR conducts pre-deployment dangerous capability evaluations for frontier AI labs (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind), testing autonomous replication, cybersecurity, CBRN, and manipulation capabi...Quality: 66/100
3.6k words
Overview
Responsible Scaling Policies (RSPsPolicyResponsible Scaling Policies (RSPs)RSPs are voluntary industry frameworks that trigger safety evaluations at capability thresholds, currently covering 60-70% of frontier development across 3-4 major labs. Estimated 10-25% risk reduc...Quality: 64/100) are self-imposed commitments by AI labs to tie AI development to safety progress. The core idea is simple: before scaling to more capable systems, labs commit to demonstrating that their safety measures are adequate for the risks those systems would pose. If evaluations reveal dangerous capabilities without adequate safeguards, development should pause until safety catches up.
AnthropicOrganizationAnthropicComprehensive profile of Anthropic, founded in 2021 by seven former OpenAI researchers (Dario and Daniela Amodei, Chris Olah, Tom Brown, Jack Clark, Jared Kaplan, Sam McCandlish) with early funding... introduced the first RSP↗🔗 web★★★★☆AnthropicResponsible Scaling Policygovernancecapabilitiestool-useagentic+1Source ↗ in September 2023, establishing "AI Safety Levels" (ASL-1 through ASL-4+) analogous to biosafety levels. OpenAIOrganizationOpenAIComprehensive organizational profile of OpenAI documenting evolution from 2015 non-profit to commercial AGI developer, with detailed analysis of governance crisis, safety researcher exodus (75% of ... followed with its Preparedness Framework↗🔗 web★★★★☆OpenAIPreparedness Frameworkbiosecuritydual-use-researchx-riskSource ↗ in December 2023, and Google DeepMindOrganizationGoogle DeepMindComprehensive overview of DeepMind's history, achievements (AlphaGo, AlphaFold with 200M+ protein structures), and 2023 merger with Google Brain. Documents racing dynamics with OpenAI and new Front...Quality: 37/100 published its Frontier Safety Framework↗🔗 web★★★★☆Google DeepMindGoogle DeepMind: Introducing the Frontier Safety FrameworksafetySource ↗ in May 2024. By late 2024, twelve major AI companies↗🔗 web★★★★☆METRMETR's analysis of 12 companiesevaluationsdangerous-capabilitiesautonomous-replicationSource ↗ had published some form of frontier AI safety policy, and the Seoul Summit↗🏛️ government★★★★☆UK GovernmentSeoul Frontier AI Commitmentsself-regulationindustry-commitmentsresponsible-scalinggovernance+1Source ↗ secured voluntary commitments from sixteen companies.
RSPs represent a significant governance innovation because they create a mechanism for safety-capability coupling without requiring external regulation. As of December 2025, 20 companies have published frontier AI safety policies, up from 12 at the May 2024 Seoul Summit. Third-party evaluators like METR have conducted pre-deployment assessments of 5+ major models. However, RSPs face fundamental challenges: they are 100% voluntary with no legal enforcement, labs set their own thresholds (leading to SaferAI grades of only 1.9-2.2 out of 5), competitive pressure among 3+ frontier labs creates incentives to interpret policies permissively, and capability doubling times of approximately 7 months may outpace evaluation science.
Quick Assessment
Dimension
Assessment
Evidence
Adoption Rate
High
20 companies with published policies as of Dec 2025; 16 original Seoul signatories
Third-Party Verification
Growing
METR evaluated GPT-4.5, Claude 3.5, o3/o4-mini; UK/US AISIs conducting evaluations
Threshold Specificity
Medium-Low
SaferAI grade: dropped from 2.2 to 1.9 after Oct 2024 RSP update
Compliance Track Record
Mixed
Anthropic self-reported evaluations 3 days late; no major policy violations yet documented
Enforcement Mechanism
None
100% voluntary; no legal penalties for non-compliance
Competitive Pressure Risk
High
Racing dynamics incentivize permissive interpretation; 3+ major labs competing
Evaluation Coverage
Partial
12 of 20 companies with published policies have external eval arrangements
Risk Assessment & Impact
Dimension
Rating
Assessment
Safety Uplift
Medium
Creates tripwires; effectiveness depends on follow-through
Capability Uplift
Neutral
Not capability-focused
Net World Safety
Helpful
Better than nothing; implementation uncertain
Lab Incentive
Moderate
PR value; may become required; some genuine commitment
Scalability
Unknown
Depends on whether commitments are honored
Deception Robustness
Partial
External policy; but evals could be fooled
SI Readiness
Unlikely
Pre-SI intervention; can't constrain SI itself
Research Investment
Dimension
Estimate
Source
Lab Policy Team Size
5-20 FTEs per major lab
Industry estimates
External Policy Orgs
$5-15M/yr combined
METROrganizationMETRMETR conducts pre-deployment dangerous capability evaluations for frontier AI labs (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind), testing autonomous replication, cybersecurity, CBRN, and manipulation capabi...Quality: 66/100, Apollo, policy institutes
Government Evaluation
$20-50M/yr
UK AISI (≈$100M budget), US AISI
Total Ecosystem
$50-100M/yr
Cross-sector estimate
Recommendation: Increase 3-5x (needs enforcement mechanisms and external verification capacity)
Differential Progress: Safety-dominant (pure governance; no capability benefit)
Comparison of Major Scaling Policies
The three leading frontier AI labs have published distinct but conceptually similar frameworks. All share the core structure of capability thresholds triggering escalating safeguards, but differ in specificity, governance, and scope.
METR↗🔗 web★★★★☆METRmetr.orgsoftware-engineeringcode-generationprogramming-aisocial-engineering+1Source ↗, UK AISI
METR↗🔗 web★★★★☆METRmetr.orgsoftware-engineeringcode-generationprogramming-aisocial-engineering+1Source ↗, UK AISI
Internal primarily
Pause Commitment
Explicit if safeguards insufficient
Implicit (must have safeguards)
Explicit for CCL thresholds
Board Override
Board can override RSO
SAG advises; leadership decides
Not specified
Capability Threshold Definitions
Lab
CBRN Threshold
Cyber Threshold
Autonomy/AI R&D Threshold
Anthropic ASL-3
"Significantly enhances capabilities of non-state actors" beyond publicly available info
Autonomous cyberattacks on hardened targets
"Substantially accelerates" AI R&D timeline
OpenAI High
"Meaningful counterfactual assistance to novice actors" creating known threats
"New risks of scaled cyberattacks"
Self-improvement creating "new challenges for human control"
OpenAI Critical
"Unprecedented new pathways to severe harm"
Novel attack vectors at scale
Recursive self-improvement; 5x speed improvement
DeepMind CCL
"Heightened risk of severe harm" from bio capabilities
"Sophisticated cyber capabilities"
"Exceptional agency" and ML research capabilities
Sources: Anthropic RSP↗🔗 web★★★★☆AnthropicAnthropic's Responsible Scaling PolicyAnthropic introduces a systematic approach to managing AI risks by establishing AI Safety Level (ASL) Standards that dynamically adjust safety measures based on model capabiliti...governancecapabilitiessafetyx-risk+1Source ↗, OpenAI Preparedness Framework v2↗🔗 webOpenAI: Preparedness Framework Version 2Source ↗, DeepMind FSF v3↗🔗 webGoogle DeepMind: Frontier Safety Framework Version 3.0safetySource ↗
Safeguard Requirements by Level
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How RSPs Work
RSPs create a framework linking capability levels to safety requirements. The core mechanism involves three interconnected processes: capability evaluation, safeguard assessment, and escalation decisions.
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RSP Ecosystem
The effectiveness of RSPs depends on a network of actors providing oversight, verification, and accountability:
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Key Components
Component
Description
Purpose
Capability Thresholds
Defined capability levels that trigger requirements
Create clear tripwires
Safety Levels
Required safeguards for each capability tier
Ensure safety scales with capability
Evaluations
Tests to determine capability and safety level
Provide evidence for decisions
Pause Commitments
Agreement to halt if safety is insufficient
Core accountability mechanism
Public Commitment
Published policy creates external accountability
Enable monitoring
Anthropic's AI Safety Levels (ASL)
Anthropic's ASL system↗🔗 web★★★★☆AnthropicAnthropic's Responsible Scaling PolicyAnthropic introduces a systematic approach to managing AI risks by establishing AI Safety Level (ASL) Standards that dynamically adjust safety measures based on model capabiliti...governancecapabilitiessafetyx-risk+1Source ↗ is modeled after Biosafety Levels (BSL-1 through BSL-4) used for handling dangerous pathogens. Each level specifies both capability thresholds and required safeguards.
Level
Capability Definition
Deployment Safeguards
Security Standard
ASL-1
No meaningful catastrophic risk
Standard terms of service
Basic security hygiene
ASL-2
Meaningful uplift but not beyond publicly available info
Content filtering, usage policies
Current security measures
ASL-3
Significantly enhances non-state actor capabilities beyond public sources
Could substantially accelerate CBRN development or enable autonomous harm
Nation-state level protections (details TBD)
Air-gapped systems, extensive vetting
Current Status (January 2026): All Claude models currently operate at ASL-2. Anthropic activated ASL-3 safeguard development in May 2025 following evaluations of Claude Opus 4.
RSP v2.2 Changes: The October 2024 update↗🔗 web★★★★☆AnthropicAnthropic: Announcing our updated Responsible Scaling PolicygovernancecapabilitiesSource ↗ separated "ASL" to refer to safeguard standards rather than model categories, introducing distinct "Capability Thresholds" and "Required Safeguards." Critics argue↗🔗 webAnthropic's Responsible Scaling Policy Update Makes a Step BackwardsAnthropic's recent Responsible Scaling Policy update reduces specificity and concrete metrics for AI safety thresholds. The changes shift from quantitative benchmarks to more qu...governancecapabilitiessafetyevaluationSource ↗ this reduced specificity compared to v1.
OpenAI's Preparedness Framework
OpenAI's Preparedness Framework↗🔗 web★★★★☆OpenAIPreparedness Frameworkbiosecuritydual-use-researchx-riskSource ↗ underwent a major revision in April 2025 (v2.0), simplifying from four risk levels to two actionable thresholds.
Risk Domain
High Threshold
Critical Threshold
Bio/Chemical
Meaningful assistance to novices creating known threats
Simplified from Low/Medium/High/Critical to just High and Critical
Removed "Persuasion" as tracked category (now handled through standard safety)
Added explicit threshold for recursive self-improvement: achieving generational improvement (e.g., o1 to o3) in 1/5th the 2024 development time
Safety Advisory Group (SAG) now oversees all threshold determinations
Recent Evaluations: OpenAI's January 2026 o3/o4-mini system card↗🔗 web★★★★☆METRmetr.orgevaluationsdangerous-capabilitiesautonomous-replicationSource ↗ reported neither model reached High threshold in any tracked category, though biological and cyber capabilities continue trending upward.
Current Implementations
Lab Policy Publication Timeline
Lab
Policy Name
Initial
Latest Version
Key Features
Anthropic
Responsible Scaling Policy↗🔗 web★★★★☆AnthropicAnthropic's Responsible Scaling PolicyAnthropic introduces a systematic approach to managing AI risks by establishing AI Safety Level (ASL) Standards that dynamically adjust safety measures based on model capabiliti...governancecapabilitiessafetyx-risk+1Source ↗
Sep 2023
v2.2 (May 2025)
ASL levels, deployment/security standards, external evals
Anthropic RSP v2.0 (criticized for reduced specificity)
Apr 2025
Framework update
OpenAI Preparedness v2.0 (simplified to High/Critical)
May 2025
First ASL-3
Anthropic activates elevated safeguards for Claude Opus 4
Oct 2025
Policy count
20 companies with published policies
Dec 2025
Third-party coverage
12 companies with METR arrangements
Seoul Summit Commitments (May 2024)
The Seoul AI Safety Summit↗🏛️ government★★★★☆UK GovernmentSeoul Frontier AI Commitmentsself-regulationindustry-commitmentsresponsible-scalinggovernance+1Source ↗ achieved a historic first: 16 frontier AI companies from the US, Europe, Middle East, and Asia signed binding-intent commitments. Signatories included Amazon, Anthropic, Cohere, G42, Google, IBM, Inflection AI, Meta, Microsoft, Mistral AI, Naver, OpenAI, Samsung, Technology Innovation Institute, xAI, and Zhipu.ai.
Commitment
Description
Compliance Verification
Safety Framework Publication
Publish framework by France Summit 2025
Public disclosure
Pre-deployment Evaluations
Test models for severe risks before deployment
Self-reported system cards
Dangerous Capability Reporting
Report discoveries to governments and other labs
Voluntary disclosure
Non-deployment Commitment
Do not deploy if risks cannot be mitigated
Self-assessed
Red-teaming
Internal and external adversarial testing
Third-party verification emerging
Cybersecurity
Protect model weights from theft
Industry standards
Follow-up: An additional 4 companies have joined since May 2024. The France AI Action Summit↗🔗 webKey Outcomes of the AI Seoul SummitSource ↗ (February 2025) reviewed compliance and expanded commitments.
Third-Party Evaluation Ecosystem
METR↗🔗 web★★★★☆METRmetr.orgsoftware-engineeringcode-generationprogramming-aisocial-engineering+1Source ↗ (Model Evaluation and Threat Research) has emerged as the leading independent evaluator, having conducted pre-deployment assessments for both Anthropic and OpenAI. Founded by Beth Barnes (former OpenAI alignment researcher) in December 2023, METR does not accept compensation for evaluations to maintain independence.
METR's Role: METR's GPT-4.5 pre-deployment evaluation↗🔗 web★★★★☆METRmetr.orgevaluationsdangerous-capabilitiesautonomous-replicationSource ↗ piloted a new form of third-party oversight: verifying developers' internal evaluation results rather than conducting fully independent assessments. This approach may scale better while maintaining accountability.
Coverage Gap: As of late 2025, METR's analysis↗🔗 web★★★★☆METRMETR's analysis of 12 companiesevaluationsdangerous-capabilitiesautonomous-replicationSource ↗ found that while 12 companies have published frontier safety policies, third-party evaluation coverage remains inconsistent, with most evaluations occurring only for the largest US labs.
Limitations and Challenges
Structural Issues
Issue
Description
Severity
Voluntary
No legal enforcement mechanism
High
Self-defined thresholds
Labs set their own standards
High
Competitive pressure
Incentive to interpret permissively
High
Evaluation limitations
Evals may miss important risks
High
Public commitment only
Limited verification of compliance
Medium
Evolving policies
Policies can be changed by labs
Medium
The Evaluation Problem
RSPs are only as good as the evaluations that trigger them:
Challenge
Explanation
Unknown risks
Can't test for capabilities we haven't imagined
Sandbagging
Models might hide capabilities during evaluation
Elicitation difficulty
True capabilities may not be revealed
Threshold calibration
Hard to know where thresholds should be
Deceptive alignment
Sophisticated models may game evaluations
Competitive Dynamics
Scenario
Lab Behavior
Safety Outcome
Mutual commitment
All labs follow RSPs
Good
One defector
Others follow, one cuts corners
Bad (defector advantages)
Many defectors
Race to bottom
Very Bad
External pressure
Regulation enforces standards
Potentially Good
Key Cruxes
Summary of Disagreements
Crux
Optimistic View
Pessimistic View
Key Evidence
Lab Commitment
Reputational stake, genuine safety motivation
No enforcement, commercial pressure dominates
0 documented major violations; 3 procedural issues self-reported
Industry self-governance can work with proper incentives
Creating accountability structures is valuable
Incremental governance improvements help
RSPs can evolve into stronger mechanisms
Less relevant if you believe:
Voluntary commitments are inherently unreliable
Labs will never meaningfully constrain themselves
Focus should be on mandatory regulation
Evaluations can't capture real risks
Sources & Resources
Primary Policy Documents
Document
Organization
Latest Version
URL
Responsible Scaling Policy
Anthropic
v2.2 (May 2025)
anthropic.com/responsible-scaling-policy↗🔗 web★★★★☆AnthropicAnthropic's Responsible Scaling PolicyAnthropic introduces a systematic approach to managing AI risks by establishing AI Safety Level (ASL) Standards that dynamically adjust safety measures based on model capabiliti...governancecapabilitiessafetyx-risk+1Source ↗
12 companies published policies; significant variation in specificity
SaferAI: RSP Update Critique↗🔗 webAnthropic's Responsible Scaling Policy Update Makes a Step BackwardsAnthropic's recent Responsible Scaling Policy update reduces specificity and concrete metrics for AI safety thresholds. The changes shift from quantitative benchmarks to more qu...governancecapabilitiessafetyevaluationSource ↗
Anthropic v2.0
Reduced specificity from quantitative to qualitative thresholds
Public tracking; external pressure for strengthening
Evaluation Methodologies
RSP effectiveness depends on the quality of evaluations that trigger safeguard requirements. Current approaches include:
Capability Evaluation Approaches
Evaluation Type
Description
Strengths
Weaknesses
Benchmark suites
Standardized tests (MMLU, HumanEval, etc.)
Reproducible, comparable
May not capture dangerous capabilities
Red-teaming
Adversarial testing by experts
Finds real-world attack vectors
Expensive, not comprehensive
Uplift studies
Compare AI-assisted vs. unassisted task completion
Directly measures counterfactual risk
Hard to simulate real adversaries
Autonomous agent tasks
Long-horizon task completion↗🔗 web★★★★☆METRMeasuring AI Ability to Complete Long Tasks - METRResearch by METR demonstrates that AI models' ability to complete tasks is exponentially increasing, with task completion time doubling approximately every 7 months. This metric...capabilitiesSource ↗
Safety Culture StrengthAi Transition Model ParameterSafety Culture StrengthThis page contains only a React component import with no actual content displayed. Cannot assess the substantive content about safety culture strength in AI development.
Positive
Creates explicit accountability mechanisms and public commitments
AI Development Racing DynamicsRiskAI Development Racing DynamicsRacing dynamics analysis shows competitive pressure has shortened safety evaluation timelines by 40-60% since ChatGPT's launch, with commercial labs reducing safety work from 12 weeks to 4-6 weeks....Quality: 72/100
Mixed
Could reduce racing if mutually honored; or create false confidence
Human Oversight QualityAi Transition Model ParameterHuman Oversight QualityThis page contains only a React component placeholder with no actual content rendered. Cannot assess substance, methodology, or conclusions.
Positive
Formalizes oversight requirements and third-party evaluation
International CoordinationAi Transition Model ParameterInternational CoordinationThis page contains only a React component placeholder with no actual content rendered. Cannot assess importance or quality without substantive text.
Positive
Seoul commitments demonstrate cross-border coordination feasibility
RSPs represent an important governance innovation that creates explicit links between capabilities and safety requirements. Their current contribution to safety is moderate but improving: the 2025 policy updates and Seoul commitments demonstrate industry convergence on the RSP concept, while third-party evaluation coverage expands. However, effectiveness depends critically on:
Voluntary compliance in the absence of legal enforcement
Evaluation quality and ability to detect dangerous capabilities
Competitive dynamics and whether labs will honor commitments under pressure
Governance structures within labs that can override commercial interests
RSPs should be understood as a foundation for stronger governance rather than a complete solution. Their greatest value may be in establishing precedents and norms that can later be codified into binding regulation.
Corporate AI Safety ResponsesApproachCorporate AI Safety ResponsesMajor AI labs invest $300-500M annually in safety (5-10% of R&D) through responsible scaling policies and dedicated teams, but face 30-40% safety team turnover and significant implementation gaps b...Quality: 68/100Dangerous Capability EvaluationsApproachDangerous Capability EvaluationsComprehensive synthesis showing dangerous capability evaluations are now standard practice (95%+ frontier models) but face critical limitations: AI capabilities double every 7 months while external...Quality: 64/100AI Safety CasesApproachAI Safety CasesSafety cases are structured arguments adapted from nuclear/aviation to justify AI system safety, with UK AISI publishing templates in 2024 and 3 of 4 frontier labs committing to implementation. Apo...Quality: 91/100Eval Saturation & The Evals GapApproachEval Saturation & The Evals GapAnalysis of accelerating AI evaluation saturation, showing benchmarks intended to last years are being saturated in months (MMLU ~4 years, MMLU-Pro ~18 months, HLE ~12 months). A 2022 Nature Commun...Quality: 65/100
People
Dario AmodeiPersonDario AmodeiComprehensive biographical profile of Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei documenting his 'race to the top' philosophy, 10-25% catastrophic risk estimate, 2026-2030 AGI timeline, and Constitutional AI appro...Quality: 41/100
Concepts
AnthropicOrganizationAnthropicComprehensive profile of Anthropic, founded in 2021 by seven former OpenAI researchers (Dario and Daniela Amodei, Chris Olah, Tom Brown, Jack Clark, Jared Kaplan, Sam McCandlish) with early funding...OpenAIOrganizationOpenAIComprehensive organizational profile of OpenAI documenting evolution from 2015 non-profit to commercial AGI developer, with detailed analysis of governance crisis, safety researcher exodus (75% of ...Responsible Scaling Policies (RSPs)PolicyResponsible Scaling Policies (RSPs)RSPs are voluntary industry frameworks that trigger safety evaluations at capability thresholds, currently covering 60-70% of frontier development across 3-4 major labs. Estimated 10-25% risk reduc...Quality: 64/100METROrganizationMETRMETR conducts pre-deployment dangerous capability evaluations for frontier AI labs (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind), testing autonomous replication, cybersecurity, CBRN, and manipulation capabi...Quality: 66/100Google DeepMindOrganizationGoogle DeepMindComprehensive overview of DeepMind's history, achievements (AlphaGo, AlphaFold with 200M+ protein structures), and 2023 merger with Google Brain. Documents racing dynamics with OpenAI and new Front...Quality: 37/100International CoordinationAi Transition Model ParameterInternational CoordinationThis page contains only a React component placeholder with no actual content rendered. Cannot assess importance or quality without substantive text.
Policy
International AI Safety Summit SeriesPolicyInternational AI Safety Summit SeriesThree international AI safety summits (2023-2025) achieved first formal recognition of catastrophic AI risks from 28+ countries, established 10+ AI Safety Institutes with $100-400M combined budgets...Quality: 63/100Voluntary AI Safety CommitmentsPolicyVoluntary AI Safety CommitmentsComprehensive empirical analysis of voluntary AI safety commitments showing 53% mean compliance rate across 30 indicators (ranging from 13% for Apple to 83% for OpenAI), with strongest adoption in ...Quality: 91/100Evals-Based Deployment GatesPolicyEvals-Based Deployment GatesEvals-based deployment gates create formal checkpoints requiring AI systems to pass safety evaluations before deployment, with EU AI Act imposing fines up to EUR 35M/7% turnover and UK AISI testing...Quality: 66/100
Key Debates
AI Safety Solution CruxesCruxAI Safety Solution CruxesComprehensive analysis of key uncertainties determining optimal AI safety resource allocation across technical verification (25-40% believe AI detection can match generation), coordination mechanis...Quality: 71/100
Safety Research
Anthropic Core ViewsSafety AgendaAnthropic Core ViewsAnthropic allocates 15-25% of R&D (~$100-200M annually) to safety research including the world's largest interpretability team (40-60 researchers), while maintaining $5B+ revenue by 2025. Their RSP...Quality: 62/100