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nuclear proliferation analogy
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A RAND Corporation policy perspective drawing on nuclear nonproliferation history to inform AI governance frameworks, relevant for policymakers and researchers thinking about international coordination on advanced AI risks.
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Importance: 55/100organizational reportanalysis
Summary
This RAND perspective explores analogies between nuclear proliferation and the spread of advanced AI capabilities, examining how arms control frameworks and nonproliferation regimes might inform AI governance strategies. It considers how dual-use risks, international coordination challenges, and verification problems that shaped nuclear policy could apply to managing dangerous AI development.
Key Points
- •Nuclear nonproliferation frameworks offer historical precedents for managing dual-use technologies with catastrophic potential
- •Verification and monitoring challenges in AI governance parallel those faced in arms control treaties
- •International coordination mechanisms may be needed to prevent dangerous AI capabilities from spreading to malicious actors
- •The dual-use nature of AI—beneficial and potentially weaponizable—mirrors the dual-use challenge of nuclear technology
- •Governance structures should consider both state and non-state actors as proliferation risks differ from purely nuclear contexts
Cited by 1 page
| Page | Type | Quality |
|---|---|---|
| AI Proliferation | Risk | 60.0 |
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The Russian "Firehose of Falsehood" Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It | RAND
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The Russian "Firehose of Falsehood" Propaganda Model
Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It
Christopher Paul , Miriam Matthews
Expert Insights Published Jul 11, 2016
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Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks with journalists after a live broadcast nationwide call-in, Moscow, April 14, 2016
Photo by Maxim Shemetov/Reuters
Since its 2008 incursion into Georgia (if not before), there has been a remarkable evolution in Russia's approach to propaganda. This new approach was on full display during the country's 2014 annexation of the Crimean peninsula. It continues to be demonstrated in support of ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Syria and in pursuit of nefarious and long-term goals in Russia's “near abroad” and against NATO allies.
In some ways, the current Russian approach to propaganda builds on Soviet Cold War–era techniques, with an emphasis on obfuscation and on getting targets to act in the interests of the propagandist without realizing that they have done so. 1 In other ways, it is completely new and driven by the characteristics of the contemporary information environment. Russia has taken advantage of technology and available media in ways that would have been inconceivable during the Cold War. Its tools and channels now include the Internet, social media, and the evolving landscape of professional and amateur journalism and media outlets.
We characterize the contemporary Russian model for propaganda as “the firehose of falsehood” because of two of its distinctive features: high numbers of channels and messages and a shameless willingness to disseminate partial truths or outright fictions. In the words of one observer, “[N]ew Russian propaganda entertains, confuses and overwhelms the audience.” 2
Contemporary Russian propaganda has at least two other distinctive features. It is also rapid, continuous, and repetitive, and it lacks commitment to consistency.
Interestingly, several of these features run directly counter to the conventional wisdom on effective influence and communication from government or defense sources, which traditionally emphasize the importance of truth, credibility, and the avoidance of contradiction. 3 Despite ignoring these traditional principles, Russia seems to have enjoyed some success under its contemporary propaganda model, either through more direct persuasion and influence or by engaging in obfuscation, confusion, and the disruption or diminution of truthful reporting a
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