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How Might the United States Engage with China on AI Security Without Diffusing Technology?
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RAND commentary from January 2025 relevant to policymakers and researchers interested in US-China AI governance diplomacy and the challenge of risk communication without technology diffusion.
Metadata
Importance: 58/100policy briefcommentary
Summary
This RAND commentary examines how the U.S. can engage China in dialogue on AI safety and security risks without inadvertently transferring sensitive AI capabilities or intellectual property. It explores diplomatic frameworks and communication channels that balance transparency with national security concerns, drawing on precedents from nuclear arms control and cybersecurity negotiations.
Key Points
- •The U.S. faces a dilemma: engaging China on AI risk requires sharing information that could accelerate Chinese AI capabilities.
- •Historical precedents from nuclear arms control and cyber diplomacy offer models for structuring limited technical dialogue with adversaries.
- •Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues (involving academics and former officials) may allow risk communication without formal technology transfer.
- •Establishing shared norms around AI incident reporting and catastrophic risk scenarios could be a starting point for bilateral engagement.
- •Effective engagement requires distinguishing between safety-relevant information and capability-enhancing information to avoid unintended diffusion.
Cited by 2 pages
| Page | Type | Quality |
|---|---|---|
| Intervention Timing Windows | Analysis | 72.0 |
| China AI Regulatory Framework | Policy | 57.0 |
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How Might the United States Engage with China on AI Security Without Diffusing Technology? | RAND
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How Might the United States Engage with China on AI Security Without Diffusing Technology?
Commentary
Jan 30, 2025
Illustration by kritsapong jieantaratip/Getty Images
By Karson Elmgren
Given the transnational risks posed by AI, the safety of AI systems, wherever they are developed and deployed, is of concern to the United States. Since China develops and deploys some of the world's most advanced AI systems, engagement with this U.S. competitor is especially important.
The U.S. AI Safety Institute (AISI)—a new government body dedicated to promoting the science and technology of AI safety—is pursuing a strategy that includes the creation of a global network of similar institutions to ensure AI safety best practices are “globally adopted to the greatest extent possible.”
As with cooperation with the Soviet Union during the Cold War on permissive action links (PALs), a technology for ensuring control over nuclear weapons, the United States may again wish to keep its competitors safer to assure its own safety. The PALs case also shows how a track record of engagement between subject matter experts can be critical to enabling cooperation later. However, as with PALs, care must be taken to make sure that in helping make Chinese AI safer, the United States does not also help it advance its AI capabilities. For this purpose, the safer bet may be avoiding cooperation on technical matters and focusing instead on topics such as risk management protocols or incident reporting.
Cooperation Later Might Depend on Engagement Now
Emerging AI technologies may pose a variety of risks requiring international cooperation in the coming years, including risks related to proliferation of dangerous biotechnology, geopolitical crises caused by failures of autonomous military systems, or large-scale accidents resulting from AI systems embedded in important parts of the world economy. For future cooperation to be effective, it might be important for the United States to engage Chinese subject matter experts on AI safety and governance now to build relationships, better knowledge of Chinese counterparts, and some degree of trust. This engagement need not constitute in-depth cooperation with ambitious specific goals, whether sharing novel technical information or pursuing collaborative initiatives, but may be useful even if restricted to interaction in multilateral and bilateral meetings, reiterating areas of consensus, or similar. It also may not need to delve deeply into core technical information related to AI capabilities but could instead focus on topics related to governance systems around AI models.
Emerging AI technologies
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