The Epistemic Challenge to Longtermism — Christian Tarsney, Synthese (2023)
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Tarsney's peer-reviewed analysis of the epistemic challenge to longtermism examines whether long-term unpredictability undermines longtermist arguments for prioritizing far-future outcomes, directly relevant to AI safety reasoning about existential risks and decision-making under uncertainty.
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Christian Tarsney examines the epistemic challenge to longtermism—the objection that long-term effects of present actions are too unpredictable to guide decision-making, even given the far future's astronomical importance. Using two simple models comparing longtermist and neartermist interventions, Tarsney finds that longtermism's case depends on either accepting minuscule probabilities of enormous payoffs (Pascalian fanaticism) or relying on non-obvious empirical assumptions about predictability. The analysis reveals that while expected value maximization may support longtermism, this conclusion is fragile and contingent on controversial premises about uncertainty and rational choice.
Cited by 1 page
| Page | Type | Quality |
|---|---|---|
| Longtermism's Philosophical Credibility After FTX | -- | 50.0 |
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The epistemic challenge to longtermism
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Published: 31 May 2023
Volume 201 , article number 195 , ( 2023 )
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Abstract
Longtermists claim that what we ought to do is mainly determined by how our actions might affect the very long-run future. A natural objection to longtermism is that these effects may be nearly impossible to predict—perhaps so close to impossible that, despite the astronomical importance of the far future, the expected value of our present actions is mainly determined by near-term considerations. This paper aims to precisify and evaluate one version of this epistemic objection to longtermism. To that end, I develop two simple models for comparing ‘longtermist’ and ‘neartermist’ interventions, incorporating the idea that it is harder to make a predictable difference to the further future. These models yield mixed conclusions: if we simply aim to maximize expected value, and don’t mind premising our choices on minuscule probabilities of astronomical payoffs, the case for longtermism looks robust. But on some prima facie plausible empirical worldviews, the expectational superiority of longtermist interventions depends heavily on these ‘Pascalian’ probabilities. So the case for longtermism may depend either on plausible but non-obvious empirical claims or on a tolerance for Pascalian fanaticism.
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