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Published by Perry World House (UPenn) in late 2025, this piece is relevant for understanding geopolitical dynamics shaping international AI governance, particularly how U.S.-China rivalry affects prospects for coordinated AI safety oversight.
Metadata
Importance: 52/100organizational reportanalysis
Summary
Kevin Werbach analyzes the prospects for U.S.-China AI cooperation under the second Trump administration, arguing that neither country can address AI risks alone and that Trump's dismissal of global AI governance will increase China's influence in international organizations while reducing their overall effectiveness. The piece compares how both nations frame the AI competition and identifies areas where direct bilateral engagement remains necessary.
Key Points
- •Trump administration's rejection of multilateral AI governance creates a vacuum that increases China's relative influence in international organizations.
- •Both the U.S. and China frame AI as a strategic competition to 'lead' rather than a binary race to 'win', suggesting space for parallel risk management.
- •China's AI+ framework and the U.S. AI Action Plan both treat AI as an economic engine and competitive tool, not primarily an existential-risk concern.
- •Hard AI oversight challenges require direct bilateral engagement between the two dominant AI powers, regardless of multilateral governance failures.
- •The Biden-era CHIPS Act and Diffusion Rule represented a 'delay and lead' strategy now being dismantled under Trump 2.0.
Cited by 2 pages
| Page | Type | Quality |
|---|---|---|
| Intervention Timing Windows | Analysis | 72.0 |
| MAIM (Mutually Assured AI Malfunction) | Approach | 55.0 |
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# U.S.-China AI Cooperation Under Trump 2.0
November 24, 2025
By Kevin Werbach
[Indo-Pacific](https://perryworldhouse.upenn.edu/news-and-insight/?exposed_taxonomy_region%5B0%5D=24),[North America](https://perryworldhouse.upenn.edu/news-and-insight/?exposed_taxonomy_region%5B0%5D=26),[Security](https://perryworldhouse.upenn.edu/news-and-insight/?exposed_taxonomy_topic%5B0%5D=28),[Technology](https://perryworldhouse.upenn.edu/news-and-insight/?exposed_taxonomy_topic%5B0%5D=61)
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This article was published alongside the PWH Report “The Future of Artificial Intelligence Governance and International Politics.”
The United States and China, as the world’s two economic, military, and technological superpowers, recognize the paramount importance of artificial intelligence (AI) as the technology that will shape global affairs in the coming decades. Neither can fully address its risks alone. With the United States, under President Donald Trump, aggressively [dismissing](https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-the-security-councils-open-debate-on-artificial-intelligence-and-international-peace-and-security/) global governance for AI, the influence of China within international organizations is bound to increase. But the influence of those organizations may decrease. Hard challenges of AI oversight will require direct involvement of both dominant players in AI development and deployment.
## What Kind of Race is AI?
The Biden administration viewed AI as a race that could be led, though not necessarily won. Through the [CHIPS Act](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-chips-act) and since-rescinded [Diffusion Rule](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/15/2025-00636/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion), it sought to delay Chinese frontier AI development to the extent possible. At the same time, it worked to promote “Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy” AI development domestically. As \[then-U.S. President Joe\] Biden’s 2023 [Executive Order](https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/10/30/executive-order-on-the-safe-secure-and-trustworthy-development-and-use-of-artificial-intelligence/) with that title states: “Harnessing AI for good and realizing its myriad benefits requires mitigating its substantial risks.” If the AI race has no visible endpoint, the best strategy is to take whatever steps ca
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