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Dan Hendrycks - Academic CV and Research Overview

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danhendrycks.com·danhendrycks.com/

Dan Hendrycks is a central figure in both technical ML safety and broader AI risk advocacy; his benchmarks are widely used in capability and safety evaluations, and CAIS under his direction has been influential in shaping mainstream AI safety discourse.

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Summary

Academic homepage and CV of Dan Hendrycks, Director of the Center for AI Safety (CAIS) and prominent ML safety researcher. Hendrycks is known for foundational work on AI robustness, anomaly detection, and safety benchmarks including MMLU, MATH, and ARC-Challenge. His research spans technical AI safety, AI risk, and policy-relevant evaluations.

Key Points

  • •Creator of widely-used safety and capability benchmarks including MMLU, MATH, and various robustness datasets
  • •Director of the Center for AI Safety (CAIS), which produced the influential 'Statement on AI Risk' signed by leading researchers
  • •Foundational contributions to out-of-distribution detection, adversarial robustness, and dataset difficulty measurement
  • •Research bridges technical ML safety work with broader AI existential risk concerns and governance implications
  • •Co-author of 'Natural Selection Favors AIs over Humans' and other papers on long-term AI risk

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# Dan Hendrycks

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dan ατ safe.ai

[CV](https://drive.google.com/file/d/15-PkWy-Mwawn-lfVS9PZRh4SqUzGnUM3/view?usp=sharing) • [Google Scholar](https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=czyretsAAAAJ&hl=en) • [Semantic Scholar](https://www.semanticscholar.org/author/Dan-Hendrycks/3422872) • [Newsletter](https://newsletter.safe.ai/) • [𝕏 (Twitter)](https://twitter.com/hendrycks)

![Dan Hendrycks Photo](https://danhendrycks.com/me_2024.webp)

Dan Hendrycks is the executive director of the [Center for AI Safety](https://safe.ai/) and an advisor to [xAI](https://x.ai/) and [Scale AI](https://scale.com/). He received his PhD in AI from UC Berkeley. He has contributed the [GELU](https://paperswithcode.com/method/gelu) activation function (the most-used activation in state-of-the-art models including BERT, GPT, Vision Transformers, etc.), benchmarks and methods in robustness, [MMLU](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MMLU), and an [Introduction to AI Safety, Ethics, and Society](https://aisafetybook.com/).


![Daniel Hendrycks Photo](https://danhendrycks.com/me_2024.webp)

## Selected Works

- [Superintelligence Strategy](https://nationalsecurity.ai/)

Dan Hendrycks, Eric Schmidt, Alexandr Wang



[\[site\]](https://nationalsecurity.ai/) [\[Standard PDF\]](https://www.nationalsecurity.ai/pdf/standard) [\[Expert PDF\]](https://www.nationalsecurity.ai/pdf/expert) [\[TIME\]](https://time.com/7265056/nuclear-level-risk-of-superintelligent-ai/)





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Rapid advances in AI are beginning to reshape national security. Destabilizing AI developments could rupture the balance of power and raise the odds of great-power conflict, while widespread proliferation of capable AI hackers and virologists would lower barriers for rogue actors to cause catastrophe. Superintelligence—AI vastly better than humans at nearly all cognitive tasks—is now anticipated by AI researchers. Just as nations once developed nuclear strategies to secure their survival, we now need a coherent superintelligence strategy to navigate a new period of transformative change. We introduce the concept of Mutual Assured AI Malfunction (MAIM): a deterrence regime resembling nuclear mutual assured destruction (MAD) where any state’s aggressive bid for unilateral AI dominance is met with preventive sabotage by rivals. Given the relative ease of sabotaging a destabilizing AI project—through interventions ranging from covert cyberattacks to potential kinetic strikes on datacenters—MAIM already describes the strategic picture AI superpowers find themselves in. Alongside this, states can engage in nonproliferation to rogue actors to keep weaponizable AI capabilities out of their hands, and they can increase their competitiveness by bolstering their economies and militaries through AI. Taken together, the three-part framework of deterrence, nonproliferation, and competitiveness outlines a robust strategy to superintelligence in the years ahead.

- [An Overview of Catastrophic AI Risks](https://arxiv.org

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