A Timing Problem for Instrumental Convergence

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# A timing problem for instrumental convergence

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- Published: 03 July 2025

- (2025)

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A timing problem for instrumental convergence


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## Abstract

Those who worry about a superintelligent AI destroying humanity often appeal to the instrumental convergence thesis—the claim that even if we don’t know what a superintelligence’s ultimate goals will be, we can expect it to pursue various instrumental goals which are useful for achieving most ends. In this paper, we argue that one of these proposed goals is mistaken. We argue that _instrumental goal preservation_—the claim that a rational agent will tend to preserve its goals because that makes it better at achieving its goals—is false on the basis of _the timing problem_: an agent which abandons or otherwise changes its goal does not thereby fail to take a required means for achieving a goal it has. Our argument draws on the distinction between means-rationality (adopting suitable means to achieve an end) and ends-rationality (choosing one’s ends based on reasons). Because proponents of the instrumental convergence thesis are concerned with means-rationality, we argue, they cannot avoid the timing problem. After defending our argument against several objections, we conclude by considering the implications our argument has for the rest of the instrumental convergence thesis and for AI safety more generally.

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