Hendrycks, D., Schmidt, E., & Wang, A.
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Foundational paper proposing a national security framework for superintelligence governance, introducing Mutual Assured AI Malfunction (MAIM) as a deterrence mechanism to address existential risks from advanced AI systems and geopolitical competition.
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Abstract
Rapid advances in AI are beginning to reshape national security. Destabilizing AI developments could rupture the balance of power and raise the odds of great-power conflict, while widespread proliferation of capable AI hackers and virologists would lower barriers for rogue actors to cause catastrophe. Superintelligence -- AI vastly better than humans at nearly all cognitive tasks -- is now anticipated by AI researchers. Just as nations once developed nuclear strategies to secure their survival, we now need a coherent superintelligence strategy to navigate a new period of transformative change. We introduce the concept of Mutual Assured AI Malfunction (MAIM): a deterrence regime resembling nuclear mutual assured destruction (MAD) where any state's aggressive bid for unilateral AI dominance is met with preventive sabotage by rivals. Given the relative ease of sabotaging a destabilizing AI project -- through interventions ranging from covert cyberattacks to potential kinetic strikes on datacenters -- MAIM already describes the strategic picture AI superpowers find themselves in. Alongside this, states can increase their competitiveness by bolstering their economies and militaries through AI, and they can engage in nonproliferation to rogue actors to keep weaponizable AI capabilities out of their hands. Taken together, the three-part framework of deterrence, nonproliferation, and competitiveness outlines a robust strategy to superintelligence in the years ahead.
Summary
This paper by Hendrycks, Schmidt, and Wang proposes a comprehensive national security strategy for superintelligence—AI systems vastly superior to humans across cognitive tasks. The authors argue that rapid AI advances pose destabilizing geopolitical risks, including lowered barriers for catastrophic misuse by rogue actors and potential great-power conflict over AI dominance. They introduce Mutual Assured AI Malfunction (MAIM), a deterrence framework analogous to nuclear MAD where states prevent rivals' unilateral AI dominance through preventive sabotage. The paper outlines a three-part strategy combining deterrence, nonproliferation to hostile actors, and competitive strengthening through AI development.
Cited by 2 pages
| Page | Type | Quality |
|---|---|---|
| Dan Hendrycks | Person | 19.0 |
| MAIM (Mutually Assured AI Malfunction) | Approach | 55.0 |
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[2503.05628] Superintelligence Strategy
See pages 1 of figures/cover_new.pdf
Superintelligence Strategy
Dan Hendrycks Eric Schmidt Alexandr Wang
Abstract
Rapid advances in AI are beginning to reshape national security. Destabilizing AI developments could rupture the balance of power and raise the odds of great-power conflict, while widespread proliferation of capable AI hackers and virologists would lower barriers for rogue actors to cause catastrophe. Superintelligence—AI vastly better than humans at nearly all cognitive tasks—is now anticipated by AI researchers. Just as nations once developed nuclear strategies to secure their survival, we now need a coherent superintelligence strategy to navigate a new period of transformative change. We introduce the concept of Mutual Assured AI Malfunction (MAIM): a deterrence regime resembling nuclear mutual assured destruction (MAD) where any state’s aggressive bid for unilateral AI dominance is met with preventive sabotage by rivals. Given the relative ease of sabotaging a destabilizing AI project—through interventions ranging from covert degradation of training runs to potential kinetic strikes on datacenters—MAIM already describes the strategic picture AI superpowers find themselves in. Alongside this, states can engage in nonproliferation to rogue actors to keep weaponizable AI capabilities out of their hands, and they can increase their competitiveness by bolstering their economies and militaries through AI. Taken together, the three-part framework of deterrence, nonproliferation, and competitiveness outlines a robust strategy to superintelligence in the years ahead.
1 Introduction
From geopolitical conflict to catastrophic misuse, the challenges AI poses are far too broad, and far too serious, for piecemeal measures. What is needed is a comprehensive approach, one that does not shy from the unsettling implications of advanced AI. As with Herman Kahn’s famous analysis of nuclear strategy [ kahn1960thermonuclear ] , superintelligence strategy requires “thinking about the unthinkable.” An effective strategy should draw from a long history of national security policy because superintelligence is inescapably a matter of national security.
AI lowers barriers for acts of mass destruction once the exclusive domain of major powers. Individuals armed with an expert-level AI virologist could create novel pathogens, while advanced hacking AIs might target energy grids at a national scale. Defense often lags behind offense in both biology and critical infrastructure, leaving large swaths of civilization vulnerable. The relative security we enjoyed when only nation-states were capable of sophisticated attacks will no longer hold if highly capable AIs can guide extremist cells from plan to execution.
Militaries see in AI the key to a decisive edge, igniting a race to develop capabilities that could over
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