RAND - Incentives for U.S.-China Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation
webCredibility Rating
High quality. Established institution or organization with editorial oversight and accountability.
Rating inherited from publication venue: RAND Corporation
A RAND policy analysis relevant to AI governance researchers and policymakers concerned with how great-power competition shapes AGI development incentives and the prospects for international AI safety cooperation.
Metadata
Summary
This RAND report analyzes the strategic dynamics between the U.S. and China in the context of artificial general intelligence development, identifying key national security scenarios where competition, conflict, or cooperation may emerge. It examines five distinct national security problem areas to map out incentive structures that could drive bilateral behavior around AGI. The report highlights both the risks of an AGI arms race and potential pathways for cooperative risk management.
Key Points
- •Examines five national security problem areas where U.S.-China AGI dynamics could manifest as conflict, competition, or cooperation.
- •Identifies incentive structures that may push both nations toward competitive or cooperative stances on AGI development.
- •Highlights risks of an AGI arms race and how competitive pressures could undermine safety considerations.
- •Explores potential frameworks for U.S.-China coordination to manage shared AGI-related national security risks.
- •Published by RAND, a major policy research institution, lending credibility to its geopolitical and strategic assessments.
Review
Cited by 2 pages
| Page | Type | Quality |
|---|---|---|
| Intervention Timing Windows | Analysis | 72.0 |
| Governance-Focused Worldview | Concept | 67.0 |
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# Incentives for U.S.-China Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation Across Artificial General Intelligence’s Five Hard National Security Problems
[Michael S. Chase](https://www.rand.org/about/people/c/chase_michael_s.html), [William Marcellino](https://www.rand.org/about/people/m/marcellino_william.html)
Expert InsightsPublished Aug 4, 2025
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In a relationship marked by strategic rivalry and mutual suspicion, the prospect of either the United States or the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—or both—achieving artificial general intelligence (AGI) is likely to heighten tensions and could even increase the risk of competition spiraling into conflict. [\[1\]](https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA4189-1.html#fn1) This is unsurprising, as AGI could reshape the global balance of power or yield “wonder weapons” capable of overwhelming intelligence systems, information ecosystems, and cyber defenses (Mitre and Predd, 2025).
Yet the emergence of AGI could also create incentives for risk reduction and cooperation. We argue that both will not only be possible but essential. The United States and China will both want to avoid miscalculation and misunderstandings that could lead to an unwanted war. Neither will be able to manage alone the risks of AGI misuse—whether from rogue actors developing novel weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), autonomous agents triggering crises, or cascading disruptions that ex
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