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Seoul Declaration on AI Safety

seoul-declaration (E279)
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  "title": "Seoul Declaration on AI Safety",
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    {
      "title": "Seoul Declaration",
      "url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/seoul-declaration-for-safe-innovative-and-inclusive-ai",
      "author": "Summit Participants"
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    {
      "title": "Frontier AI Safety Commitments",
      "url": "https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/frontier-ai-safety-commitments-ai-seoul-summit-2024",
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Frontmatter
{
  "title": "Seoul AI Safety Summit Declaration",
  "description": "The May 2024 Seoul AI Safety Summit secured voluntary commitments from 16 frontier AI companies (including Chinese firm Zhipu AI) and established an 11-nation AI Safety Institute network. While 12 of 16 signatory companies have published safety frameworks by late 2024, the voluntary nature limits enforcement, with only 10-30% probability of evolving into binding international agreements within 5 years.",
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---
title: Seoul AI Safety Summit Declaration
description: The May 2024 Seoul AI Safety Summit secured voluntary commitments from 16 frontier AI companies (including Chinese firm Zhipu AI) and established an 11-nation AI Safety Institute network. While 12 of 16 signatory companies have published safety frameworks by late 2024, the voluntary nature limits enforcement, with only 10-30% probability of evolving into binding international agreements within 5 years.
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llmSummary: The May 2024 Seoul AI Safety Summit achieved voluntary commitments from 16 frontier AI companies (80% of development capacity) and established an 11-nation AI Safety Institute network, with 75% compliance (12/16 companies published frameworks by December 2024). However, voluntary nature limits enforcement, with only 10-30% probability of evolving into binding agreements within 5 years and minimal progress on incident reporting or common risk thresholds.
lastEdited: "2025-12-28"
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  - Complete 'Limitations' section (6 placeholders)
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  completeness: 7
clusters:
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subcategory: governance-international
entityType: approach
---
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### Quick Assessment

| Dimension | Assessment | Evidence |
|-----------|------------|----------|
| **Scope** | Moderate-High | 16 companies representing approximately 80% of frontier AI development capacity; 27 countries + EU signed ministerial statement |
| **Bindingness** | Low | All commitments voluntary; no enforcement mechanisms or legal obligations |
| **Implementation** | 75% compliance | 12 of 16 signatory companies published safety frameworks by December 2024; quality varies substantially |
| **Novelty** | High | First coordinated international company commitments; first AI Safety Institute network |
| **Chinese Engagement** | Limited breakthrough | Zhipu AI signed company commitments; China did not sign Seoul Ministerial Statement |
| **Durability** | Uncertain | 10-30% probability of evolving to binding agreements within 5 years; competitive pressures may erode compliance |
| **Follow-through** | Mixed | February 2025 Paris Summit saw no progress on red lines/risk thresholds despite Seoul commitments |

## Overview

The Seoul AI Safety Summit, held May 21-22, 2024, marked a pivotal moment in international <EntityLink id="E608">AI governance</EntityLink> by securing the first coordinated voluntary commitments from major AI companies alongside strengthened government cooperation. Building on the foundational Bletchley Park Summit of November 2023, Seoul transformed high-level principles into specific, though non-binding, commitments from 16 leading AI companies representing most frontier AI development globally.

The summit's significance lies not in creating legally enforceable obligations—which remain absent—but in establishing institutional infrastructure for future governance. For the first time, companies including <EntityLink id="E218">OpenAI</EntityLink>, <EntityLink id="E98">Google DeepMind</EntityLink>, <EntityLink id="E22">Anthropic</EntityLink>, and even China's Zhipu AI publicly committed to specific safety practices, transparency measures, and incident reporting protocols. Simultaneously, the summit formalized an international AI Safety Institute network, creating mechanisms for coordinated evaluation standards and information sharing between national safety institutes.

While critics rightfully note the voluntary nature of these commitments and the absence of enforcement mechanisms, the Seoul Summit represents the most concrete progress to date in building international consensus around AI safety requirements. The real test will be implementation compliance over the next 2-3 years and whether this foundation can evolve toward binding international agreements.

### Risks Addressed

| Risk Category | Mechanism | Effectiveness |
|--------------|-----------|---------------|
| <EntityLink id="E239">Racing Dynamics</EntityLink> | Coordinated commitments reduce incentives for unsafe speed | Low-Moderate: voluntary compliance |
| <EntityLink id="E42">Bioweapons</EntityLink> | Safety evaluations include biosecurity testing | Moderate: major labs evaluating |
| <EntityLink id="E86">Cyberweapons</EntityLink> | Pre-deployment capability evaluations | Moderate: AISI testing capabilities |
| <EntityLink id="E93">Deceptive Alignment</EntityLink> | Framework for capability thresholds | Low: no alignment-specific requirements |
| <EntityLink id="E68">Concentration of Power</EntityLink> | International cooperation reduces unilateral action | Low-Moderate: limited scope |

## Company Commitments Framework

The <R id="944fc2ac301f8980">Frontier AI Safety Commitments</R> signed by 16 companies established three core pillars of voluntary obligations that represent the most specific corporate AI safety commitments achieved through international coordination to date. These commitments notably extend beyond existing industry practices in several areas, particularly around incident reporting and transparency requirements.

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    COMMIT --> PILLAR2[Transparency]
    COMMIT --> PILLAR3[Incident Reporting]

    PILLAR1 --> IMPL1[RSPs / Equivalent<br/>Policies]
    PILLAR1 --> IMPL2[Pre-deployment<br/>Evaluations]

    PILLAR2 --> IMPL3[External Evaluation<br/>Cooperation]
    PILLAR2 --> IMPL4[AISI Information<br/>Sharing]

    PILLAR3 --> IMPL5[Safety Incident<br/>Disclosure]
    PILLAR3 --> IMPL6[Common Reporting<br/>Standards]

    IMPL1 --> OUT[12/16 Published<br/>by Dec 2024]
    IMPL2 --> OUT

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### Signatory Companies and Implementation Status

| Company | Region | Prior Framework | Published Post-Seoul | Implementation Quality |
|---------|--------|-----------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Anthropic | US | RSP (2023) | Yes | High - specific thresholds |
| OpenAI | US | Preparedness Framework (2023) | Yes | High - specific thresholds |
| Google DeepMind | US/UK | Frontier Safety Framework | Yes | High - specific thresholds |
| Meta | US | Limited | Yes | Moderate - general principles |
| Microsoft | US | Limited | Yes | Moderate - general principles |
| Amazon | US | Limited | Yes | Moderate - general principles |
| xAI | US | None | Yes | Low - minimal detail |
| Cohere | Canada | None | Yes | Moderate |
| Mistral AI | France | None | Yes | Low - minimal detail |
| Naver | South Korea | None | Yes | Moderate |
| Samsung Electronics | South Korea | None | Partial | Low - restates existing |
| IBM | US | Existing ethics | Yes | Moderate |
| Inflection AI | US | Limited | Yes | Low |
| G42 | UAE | None | Yes | Moderate |
| Technology Innovation Institute | UAE | None | Partial | Low |
| Zhipu AI | China | None | Limited | Low - minimal public detail |

**Safety Framework Requirements**: All signatory companies committed to publishing and implementing safety frameworks, typically Responsible Scaling Policies (RSPs) or equivalent structures. According to <R id="7e3b7146e1266c71">METR's analysis</R>, 12 companies have now published frontier AI safety policies, with quality varying significantly. Leading labs (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google DeepMind) have implemented comprehensive frameworks with specific capability thresholds and conditional deployment commitments. However, companies like Samsung Electronics and some Asian participants have published frameworks that largely restate existing practices without meaningful new commitments.

**Transparency and Information Sharing**: Companies agreed to provide transparency on their AI systems' capabilities, limitations, and domains of appropriate use. This includes supporting external evaluation efforts and sharing relevant information with AI Safety Institutes for research purposes. The <R id="fdf68a8f30f57dee">UK AI Security Institute</R> has conducted evaluations of frontier models since November 2023, with a joint UK-US evaluation of Claude 3.5 Sonnet representing the most comprehensive government-led safety evaluation to date.

**Incident Reporting Protocols**: Perhaps the most novel aspect involves commitments to share information about safety incidents and support development of common reporting standards. This addresses a critical gap in current AI governance, as no systematic incident reporting mechanism previously existed across the industry. However, the definition of reportable "incidents" remains undefined, and as of December 2024, no meaningful systematic incident sharing has been observed.

**"Intolerable Risk" Thresholds**: A crucial commitment requires companies to establish clear thresholds for severe, unacceptable risks. If these thresholds are met and mitigations are insufficient, organizations pledged not to develop or deploy the model at all. This represents the strongest commitment in the framework, though definitions of "intolerable" remain company-specific.

## AI Safety Institute Network Development

The <R id="9d15bf121467eba7">Seoul Statement of Intent toward International Cooperation on AI Safety Science</R> established an international AI Safety Institute network, representing potentially the most durable outcome of the summit. This creates institutional infrastructure that could outlast political changes and competitive pressures affecting company commitments.

### Network Member Countries and Status

| Country/Region | Institute Status | Staff (Est.) | Focus Areas | First Meeting Attendance |
|---------------|------------------|--------------|-------------|-------------------------|
| United Kingdom | Operational (Nov 2023) | 100+ | Model evaluation, red-teaming | Yes (Nov 2024) |
| United States | Operational (Feb 2024) | 50+ | Standards, evaluation | Yes (Nov 2024) |
| European Union | AI Office operational | 30+ | Regulatory implementation | Yes (Nov 2024) |
| Japan | Established (Feb 2024) | 20+ | Safety research | Yes (Nov 2024) |
| Singapore | Operational | 15+ | Governance, testing | Yes (Nov 2024) |
| South Korea | Established | 20+ | Evaluation, policy | Yes (Nov 2024) |
| Canada | In development | 10+ | Safety research | Yes (Nov 2024) |
| France | Established | 15+ | Research, standards | Yes (Nov 2024) |
| Kenya | Announced | Planned | Global South engagement | Yes (Nov 2024) |
| Australia | In development | Planned | Evaluation | Yes (Nov 2024) |

The <R id="d73b249449782a66">first meeting of the International Network</R> occurred November 20-21, 2024 in San Francisco, with all member countries represented.

**Operational Framework**: The network commits participating institutes to share information on evaluation methodologies, coordinate research efforts, and establish personnel exchange programs. According to <R id="0572f91896f52377">CSIS analysis</R>, suggested collaboration areas include: coordinating research, sharing resources and relevant information, developing best practices, and exchanging or co-developing AI model evaluations.

**Technical Capabilities**: The network is developing harmonized evaluation methodologies for frontier AI systems. The <R id="7042c7f8de04ccb1">UK AI Security Institute's Frontier AI Trends Report</R> (December 2024) represents the first comprehensive government assessment of frontier AI capabilities, finding that:
- AI models can now complete apprentice-level cybersecurity tasks 50% of the time (up from 10% in early 2024)
- Models first exceeded expert biologist performance on open-ended questions in early 2024
- Time for red-teamers to find "universal jailbreaks" increased from minutes to hours between model generations

**Resource Requirements**: Establishing effective network operations requires substantial investment:
- UK AI Security Institute: approximately \$50 million annually (tripled funding to GBP 300 million announced at Bletchley)
- US AISI: \$10-20 million initial allocation
- Network coordination costs: estimated \$5-15 million annually
- Individual member institutes: \$10-50 million per institute depending on scope

## Summit Timeline and Context

The Seoul Summit sits within a broader trajectory of international AI governance efforts. Understanding this context helps assess its significance and likely trajectory.

### AI Safety Summit Progression

| Summit | Date | Key Outcomes | Signatories | Progress vs. Prior |
|--------|------|--------------|-------------|-------------------|
| Bletchley Park (UK) | Nov 2023 | <R id="243fa770c13b0c44">Bletchley Declaration</R>; UK AISI established | 28 countries + EU | First international AI safety consensus |
| Seoul (South Korea) | May 2024 | Company commitments; AISI network; Ministerial statement | 27 countries + EU; 16 companies | First company commitments; institutional infrastructure |
| Paris (France) | Feb 2025 | \$400M Current AI foundation; Coalition for Sustainable AI; <R id="a55e44ac56e35640">Paris Statement</R> | 58 countries (US/UK declined declaration) | Shifted focus from safety to "action"/adoption |
| Delhi (India) | Feb 2026 | Planned | Projected 30+ countries | Focus on AI impact and Global South inclusion |

The <R id="201fdc6d92520b6c">Paris AI Action Summit</R> (February 2025) represented a notable departure from the Bletchley-Seoul safety focus. According to <R id="1ffe2ab6afdbd5c5">analysis by The Future Society</R>, the summit "did not make any progress on defining red lines and risk thresholds despite this being a key commitment from Seoul." Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei reportedly called it a "missed opportunity" for AI safety.

## Safety and Risk Implications

The Seoul Summit outcomes present both concerning limitations and promising developments for AI safety, with the balance depending heavily on implementation effectiveness over the next 2-3 years.

### Promising Safety Developments

| Development | Significance | Limitations |
|------------|--------------|-------------|
| Industry-wide framework requirement | Creates accountability; reputational stakes | Quality varies; no enforcement |
| AI Safety Institute network | Coordinated government evaluation capacity | Funding uncertain; coordination costs |
| Chinese company participation | First Chinese signatory (Zhipu AI) | China did not sign government declaration |
| Incident reporting commitment | Addresses critical governance gap | No observable implementation yet |
| "Intolerable risk" threshold concept | Strongest commitment to halt development | Definitions remain company-specific |

The inclusion of Chinese company Zhipu AI represents a breakthrough in international cooperation. According to <R id="d0e36601100c356d">Carnegie Endowment analysis</R>, Chinese views on AI safety are evolving rapidly, with 17 Chinese companies (including Alibaba, Baidu, Huawei, Tencent) subsequently signing domestic "Artificial Intelligence Safety Commitments" in December 2024.

### Critical Safety Concerns

The voluntary nature of all commitments creates fundamental enforceability problems. Companies facing competitive pressure may abandon commitments without consequences. Key concerns include:

- **No enforcement mechanisms**: Public naming-and-shaming is the only accountability tool
- **Company-defined thresholds**: No common "intolerable risk" definition exists across signatories
- **Implementation quality variance**: Only 3-4 companies have comprehensive frameworks with specific capability thresholds
- **Incident reporting failure**: No meaningful systematic incident sharing observed since May 2024
- **Racing dynamics unaddressed**: Framework focuses on individual companies, not competitive interactions

**Systemic Risk Considerations**: The summit framework does not address fundamental questions about AI development racing dynamics or coordination failures that could lead to unsafe deployment decisions. The focus on individual company commitments may miss systemic risks arising from competitive interactions between companies. Additionally, the framework provides no mechanism for handling potential bad actors or companies that refuse to participate in voluntary commitments.

## Implementation Trajectory and Compliance Assessment

Eight months post-summit (as of December 2024), implementation patterns reveal significant variation in compliance quality and commitment durability, with early indicators suggesting 60-70% of companies will maintain substantive compliance over 2-3 year horizons.

### Compliance Metrics by Commitment Area

| Commitment Area | Compliance Rate | Quality Assessment | Key Gaps |
|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------|----------|
| Published safety framework | 75% (12/16) | Variable: 3 high, 5 moderate, 4 low | 4 companies with minimal/no framework |
| Pre-deployment evaluations | 50-60% (estimated) | Unclear: no verification mechanism | No independent evaluation observed |
| AISI cooperation | 30-40% | Limited to major labs | Most companies not publicly engaged |
| Incident reporting | less than 10% | Non-functional | No systematic sharing observed |
| Transparency on capabilities | 40-50% | Moderate for major labs | Proprietary information concerns |

**Current Compliance Status**: According to <R id="7e3b7146e1266c71">METR's tracking</R>, 12 companies have published frontier AI safety policies. However, only Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google DeepMind have implemented frameworks with:
- Specific capability thresholds triggering safety requirements
- Explicit conditions for halting development or deployment
- External evaluation commitments
- Regular public updates on implementation

Pre-deployment evaluation practices show more concerning variation. While major labs conduct internal safety evaluations, the rigor, scope, and independence of these evaluations differ significantly. No company has implemented truly independent evaluation processes, and evaluation criteria remain largely proprietary.

### Near-Term Trajectory (2025-2026)

| Milestone | Target Date | Probability | Dependencies |
|-----------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| Harmonized AISI evaluation standards | Mid-2025 | 60-70% | Network coordination funding |
| Systematic incident reporting | Late 2025 | 20-30% | Definition agreement; trust building |
| Third-party verification pilots | 2025-2026 | 40-50% | Industry buy-in; funding |
| First binding national implementations | 2025-2026 | 50-60% | EU AI Act enforcement; US action |
| Common "intolerable risk" definitions | 2026+ | 20-30% | Requires major coordination |

The <R id="49bf408e78f162a1">Paris Summit outcome</R> demonstrates the fragility of safety-focused momentum. Many companies that signed Seoul commitments used Paris to showcase products rather than present the promised safety frameworks. The US and UK declined to sign the Paris declaration on inclusive AI, citing concerns about governance specificity.

### Medium-Term Evolution (2026-2029)

The voluntary framework established at Seoul likely represents a transitional phase toward more formal governance mechanisms. Scenario probabilities:

| Scenario | Probability | Conditions | Implications |
|----------|-------------|------------|--------------|
| Sustained voluntary compliance | 30-40% | Continued industry leadership; competitive stability | Gradual improvement; no enforcement |
| Evolution to binding agreements | 10-30% | Major incident; political leadership; industry support | Significant governance strengthening |
| Regional fragmentation | 25-35% | Geopolitical tensions; regulatory divergence | Multiple incompatible frameworks |
| Framework erosion | 15-25% | Racing dynamics; capability breakthroughs; economic pressure | Return to pre-Seoul baseline |

The 10-30% probability of achieving binding agreements within 5 years reflects both the political difficulty of international treaty-making and the rapid pace of AI development that may force policy acceleration.

## Critical Uncertainties and Limitations

Several fundamental uncertainties limit confidence in the Seoul framework's long-term effectiveness and constrain assessment of its ultimate impact on AI safety outcomes.

### Key Uncertainty Assessment

| Uncertainty | Current State | Resolution Timeline | Impact if Unresolved |
|-------------|---------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Enforcement viability | No mechanisms exist | 2-5 years for binding options | Continued free-rider risk |
| Verification feasibility | 40-60% verifiable | 1-2 years for pilot programs | Low accountability |
| Competitive pressure effects | Increasing | Continuous | Framework erosion likely |
| Geopolitical fragmentation | US-China tensions high | Structural; no clear timeline | Multiple incompatible regimes |
| Technical evaluation limits | Substantial gaps | Improving with AISI work | Dangerous capabilities may deploy |

**Enforcement and Verification Challenges**: The absence of enforcement mechanisms creates a classic collective action problem where individual companies may benefit from abandoning commitments while others maintain compliance. According to <R id="09e770780facb529">academic analysis</R>, measuring compliance with safety framework commitments presents significant challenges: "Key commitments may be subjective or open to interpretation, potentially setting a low bar for certifying a frontier AI company as safe."

**Competitive Pressure Dynamics**: The sustainability of voluntary commitments under intense competitive pressure remains highly uncertain. As AI capabilities approach potentially transformative thresholds, first-mover advantages may create strong incentives to abandon safety commitments. The <R id="df46edd6fa2078d1">2025 AI Safety Index</R> by the Future of Life Institute provides ongoing assessment of company safety practices.

**Geopolitical Fragmentation Risks**: While the Seoul Summit achieved broader participation than previous efforts, including limited Chinese engagement, underlying geopolitical tensions could fragment the framework. Notably:
- China signed company commitments but not the government declaration
- US and UK declined to sign the Paris Summit declaration
- Export controls on AI hardware create structural decoupling pressures

**Technical Implementation Gaps**: Significant uncertainties remain about the technical feasibility of many commitments. The <R id="0fd3b1f5c81a37d8">UK AI Security Institute's evaluations</R> note that while progress is being made, evaluation methodologies still have substantial limitations, and rapid capability advancement may outpace evaluation technique development.

The Seoul Summit represents meaningful progress in building international consensus and institutional infrastructure for AI safety governance, but its ultimate effectiveness depends on resolving these fundamental uncertainties through implementation experience and potential evolution toward more binding frameworks.

---

## Sources and References

### Primary Documents

- <R id="2c62af9e9fdd09c2">Seoul Declaration for Safe, Innovative and Inclusive AI</R> - UK Government publication of the full declaration text
- <R id="944fc2ac301f8980">Frontier AI Safety Commitments</R> - Full text of company commitments
- <R id="9d15bf121467eba7">Seoul Statement of Intent on AI Safety Science</R> - AI Safety Institute network framework
- <R id="243fa770c13b0c44">Bletchley Declaration</R> - Foundation document from November 2023 summit

### Analysis and Commentary

- <R id="7e3b7146e1266c71">METR Frontier AI Safety Commitments Tracker</R> - Ongoing compliance monitoring
- <R id="0572f91896f52377">CSIS: AI Safety Institute International Network Analysis</R> - Policy recommendations
- <R id="d0e36601100c356d">Carnegie Endowment: China's Views on AI Safety</R> - Analysis of Chinese engagement
- <R id="1ffe2ab6afdbd5c5">The Future Society: Paris Summit Analysis</R> - Assessment of follow-through

### Government and Institutional Sources

- <R id="fdf68a8f30f57dee">UK AI Security Institute</R> - Frontier AI Trends Report and evaluation work
- <R id="d73b249449782a66">First Meeting of International AISI Network</R> - EU Commission announcement
- <R id="1b4616cecfae83d5">AI Seoul Summit Official Portal</R> - UK Government summit materials

### News Coverage

- <R id="949e4dabcaaff50f">Infosecurity Magazine: Seoul Summit Coverage</R> - Company commitment announcement
- <R id="eac5cb1c33cb82d8">Computer Weekly: 27 Nations and EU Statement</R> - Ministerial statement coverage
- <R id="49bf408e78f162a1">TechUK: Paris Summit Outcomes</R> - Follow-up analysis

---

## AI Transition Model Context

The Seoul Declaration improves the <EntityLink id="ai-transition-model" /> through <EntityLink id="E60" />:

| Factor | Parameter | Impact |
|--------|-----------|--------|
| <EntityLink id="E60" /> | <EntityLink id="E171" /> | 16 frontier AI companies (80% of development capacity) signed voluntary commitments |
| <EntityLink id="E60" /> | <EntityLink id="E167" /> | Established 11-nation AI Safety Institute network |
| <EntityLink id="E205" /> | <EntityLink id="E264" /> | 12 of 16 signatories published safety frameworks by late 2024 |

The voluntary nature limits enforcement; only 10-30% probability of evolving into binding international agreements within 5 years.