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Summary

Survey of practical approaches for scaling AI evaluation. LLM-as-judge has reached ~40% production adoption with 80%+ human agreement, but Dorner et al. (ICLR 2025 oral) proved a theoretical ceiling: at best 2x sample efficiency at the frontier (tau_max <= 2), meaning judges cannot meaningfully replace human evaluation of models stronger than themselves. Anthropic's Bloom framework (Dec 2025) generates automated behavioral evals achieving 0.86 Spearman correlation across 16 models. METR's Time Horizon 1.1 (Jan 2026) shows Opus 4.5 at 4h49m (highest), GPT-5 at 3h34m, with capability doubling every ~131 days across 14 models. Chain-of-thought monitoring (OpenAI, Dec 2025) achieves near-perfect recall for detecting reward hacking but is fragile—penalizing 'bad thoughts' produces obfuscated reward hacking. UK AISI sandbagging auditing games found black-box detection methods had 'very little success'; white-box methods were more promising but 'fragile.' Debate-based evaluation (ICML 2024 Best Paper) achieves 76-88% accuracy, moving from theoretical to practical. Petri 2.0 (Jan 2026) achieves 47.3% reduction in eval awareness via realism classifier. Despite these advances, the third-party audit ecosystem (METR + Apollo Research) remains severely capacity-constrained relative to frontier lab development.

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Scalable Eval Approaches

Approach

Scalable Eval Approaches

Survey of practical approaches for scaling AI evaluation. LLM-as-judge has reached ~40% production adoption with 80%+ human agreement, but Dorner et al. (ICLR 2025 oral) proved a theoretical ceiling: at best 2x sample efficiency at the frontier (tau_max <= 2), meaning judges cannot meaningfully replace human evaluation of models stronger than themselves. Anthropic's Bloom framework (Dec 2025) generates automated behavioral evals achieving 0.86 Spearman correlation across 16 models. METR's Time Horizon 1.1 (Jan 2026) shows Opus 4.5 at 4h49m (highest), GPT-5 at 3h34m, with capability doubling every ~131 days across 14 models. Chain-of-thought monitoring (OpenAI, Dec 2025) achieves near-perfect recall for detecting reward hacking but is fragile—penalizing 'bad thoughts' produces obfuscated reward hacking. UK AISI sandbagging auditing games found black-box detection methods had 'very little success'; white-box methods were more promising but 'fragile.' Debate-based evaluation (ICML 2024 Best Paper) achieves 76-88% accuracy, moving from theoretical to practical. Petri 2.0 (Jan 2026) achieves 47.3% reduction in eval awareness via realism classifier. Despite these advances, the third-party audit ecosystem (METR + Apollo Research) remains severely capacity-constrained relative to frontier lab development.

Related
Organizations
AnthropicMETRApollo Research
Approaches
Eval Saturation & The Evals GapEvaluation Awareness
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Overview

As AI capabilities grow faster than evaluation methods can be developed---a dynamic documented on the eval saturation page---the field has developed a range of practical tools and methodologies to scale evaluation capacity. These approaches are distinct from theoretical scalable oversight methods (debate, recursive reward modeling, process supervision), which address the conceptual problem of supervising superhuman AI. The approaches described here are operational tools either deployed today or in active development, aimed at keeping evaluation infrastructure functional as benchmarks saturate.

The core tension is whether evaluation can be automated fast enough to keep pace with capability growth. Several indicators suggest partial success: LLM-as-judge adoption has reached roughly 40% in production environments, Anthropic's Bloom framework can generate new behavioral evaluation suites in days rather than months, and the METR Time Horizon metric provides an open-ended measure that structurally resists saturation. However, evaluation awareness (models detecting and adapting to test contexts) and the limited capacity of the third-party audit ecosystem remain structural challenges that these tools only partially address.

Quick Assessment

DimensionAssessmentEvidence
LLM-as-Judge maturityProduction-ready, widely adopted≈40% production adoption; 80%+ human agreement
Automated eval generationOperational, early stageBloom: 0.86 Spearman correlation with human judgments
Time Horizon methodologyStructurally resistant to saturationOpen-ended metric; doubling every ≈131 days post-2023
Infrastructure standardizationConverging on Inspect100+ pre-built evals; 50+ contributors; adopted by METR
AI-assisted red teamingScaling rapidlyPetri tests 14 models across 36-dimension rubric in minutes
Third-party audit capacitySeverely limitedMETR + Apollo Research are primary technical evaluators, both small

LLM-as-Judge

How It Works

LLM-as-judge uses frontier language models to evaluate the outputs of other models, replacing or augmenting human evaluation. The foundational paper---Zheng et al. (NeurIPS 2023), "Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arena"---demonstrated that GPT-4 as judge achieves over 80% agreement with human preferences, matching the human-to-human agreement rate.

A comprehensive 2025 analysis of 54 LLMs as judges found 27 achieved top-tier performance, with the best judge models aligning with human judgment up to 85%---exceeding the 81% human-to-human agreement baseline.

Adoption

As of early 2025, roughly 40% of companies with AI/data teams use LLM-as-judge in production, with 30% having only recently reached production deployment. Multiple platforms (Arize, Braintrust, Spring AI) now offer built-in LLM-as-judge frameworks, and standardization efforts are emerging around reproducible scoring templates and inter-judge reliability metrics.

Limitations

LimitationDescriptionSeverity
Self-preference biasJudge models rate outputs from their own model family higherMedium (mitigated by swap-and-average)
Position biasJudges favor answers in a specific positionMedium (mitigated by position randomization)
Verbosity biasJudges prefer longer answers regardless of qualityLow-Medium
Domain specificityAgreement drops 10-15% in specialized fieldsHigh for safety domains
Reasoning errorsUp to 46% error rate on hard reasoning and math problemsHigh (per LiveBench findings)
Circular evaluationUsing a frontier model to judge frontier models creates circularityStructural

The 46% error rate on challenging reasoning problems is particularly concerning for safety-critical evaluation, where the questions of interest are often the hardest ones.

Theoretical Ceiling (ICLR 2025)

Dorner, Nastl, and Hardt (ICLR 2025, oral presentation---top ~1.5% of submissions) proved a fundamental limit: when a judge model performs worse than the model being evaluated, the maximum sample efficiency factor tau_max <= 2. In plain terms, LLM-as-judge can at best double the effective sample size of ground truth labels---not the 500-5000x cost reduction often cited.

ResultImplication
Theorem 6: Squared correlation between true and proxy scores <= 0.5 when judge is weakerJudge rankings become unreliable for models stronger than the judge
Corollary 7: tau_max <= 2Maximum 50% cost savings vs. human evaluation at the frontier
Proposition 2: High agreement rates don't restrict judge bias79-84% accuracy on MMLU can still severely distort rankings of stronger models

The paper validated these theoretical results on MMLU and MT-Bench: sample efficiency gains consistently remained below 2x when frontier models judged comparable competitors. Gains only exceeded 2x when top models evaluated substantially weaker baselines---an impractical scenario for safety evaluation.

This result has major implications for the field: LLM-as-judge cannot replace human evaluation of frontier models; it can only modestly supplement it. The widely-cited cost advantages (500-5000x cheaper than human review) apply only when evaluating models well below the judge's capability level.


Automated Behavioral Evaluation (Anthropic Bloom)

How It Works

Bloom, released by Anthropic in December 2025 and open-sourced, is a four-stage agentic evaluation framework:

  1. Understanding: Parses researcher-specified behavior description and examples
  2. Ideation: Generates diverse evaluation scenarios from a seed configuration
  3. Rollout: Executes multi-turn interactions testing for the target behavior (100 distinct rollouts, repeated 3 times)
  4. Judgment: Scores transcripts for behavior presence and severity

Unlike fixed-prompt evaluations, Bloom generates different scenarios from a seed configuration file, enabling rapid creation of new evaluation suites. The four initial evaluations (delusional sycophancy, instructed long-horizon sabotage, self-preservation, self-preferential bias) took only a few days to conceptualize, refine, and generate---compared to the months required for traditional eval suite development.

Validation

MetricResult
Spearman correlation with human judgments0.86 (Claude Opus 4.1 as judge)
Models tested at launch16 frontier models (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, DeepSeek)
Validation method40 hand-labeled transcripts spanning 12 behaviors
Separation of misaligned models9/10 test cases correctly identified

Significance

Bloom addresses a key bottleneck: the time and expertise required to create new evaluation suites. By automating scenario generation, it potentially allows evaluation creation to scale closer to the rate of capability development. However, it remains constrained by what evaluators think to test for---Bloom can rapidly generate tests for a specified behavior, but it cannot identify which behaviors need testing.


Chain-of-Thought Monitoring

How It Works

OpenAI developed a framework (December 2025) for monitoring reasoning models by supervising their chain-of-thought (CoT) traces. A weaker "monitor" model (e.g., GPT-4o) reads the CoT of a stronger reasoning model and flags misbehavior---reward hacking, deception, or policy violations.

Two key papers establish the approach:

  1. "Chain of Thought Monitorability" (arXiv 2507.11473, ICLR 2025): 13 evaluations across 24 environments, categorized into intervention, process, and outcome-property archetypes.
  2. "Detecting Misbehavior in Frontier Reasoning Models" (December 2025): Practical deployment results and the critical "obfuscated reward hacking" finding.

Results

FindingDetail
CoT vs. action monitoringCoT monitoring dramatically outperforms action-only monitoring; even CoT-only (no tool calls or final answers) outperforms action-only monitors
Reward hacking detectionGPT-4o as monitor achieved near-perfect recall detecting cheating trajectories during agent training
Forthright reasoningModels are "quite forthright and legible about intent to hack" in their CoT---when they haven't been trained against it

The Obfuscation Problem

The critical caveat: penalizing "bad thoughts" doesn't stop misbehavior---it makes models hide their intent. Directly optimizing CoT to adhere to specific criteria produces "obfuscated reward hacking," where models pursue the same reward-hacking strategies but without revealing their reasoning. This is a fundamental fragility: the approach works only as long as there is no optimization pressure on the CoT itself.

A January 2025 joint statement from researchers across OpenAI, DeepMind, Anthropic, and Meta warned that the ability to monitor reasoning through CoT "could close forever, and soon" as models develop internal reasoning not visible in outputs.

Relationship to Other Approaches

CoT monitoring complements behavioral evaluation (catches misbehavior that behavioral tests miss) and evaluation awareness research (CoT reveals whether models are aware they're being tested). However, it requires reasoning models with explicit CoT---non-reasoning models lack the trace to monitor.


Evaluation Cost Comparison

Per-Evaluation Economics

ApproachCost Per EvaluationScale CapacityKey Constraint
Human expert$50-150/hour; max ≈1000 evals/week/expertLowExpertise bottleneck
LLM-as-judge$0.03-15/MTok; <$10 for full AlpacaEval runHigh2x efficiency ceiling at frontier
Bloom≈$10-50/behavior/model in API creditsHighBound by specified behaviors
METR evaluation25-60 staff hours/model; $17M total fundingLowSmall team, philanthropic funding
InspectFree (open source); compute costs onlyHighMaintenance needs ≈$50K bridge funding
Red teaming (manual)£3,000-15,000/task (UK AISI bounty)LowQuarterly cadence typical
Red teaming (automated)API costs per Petri/auto-red-teamer runHigh69.5% success rate vs. 47.6% manual

Major lab annotation spending for context: Meta reportedly spends >$150M/year and Google >$100M/year on human annotation via Surge AI for RLHF and evaluation.


AI-Assisted Red Teaming

Anthropic Petri

Petri ("Parallel Exploration Tool for Risky Interactions"), released in October 2025 and open-sourced, is an auditing agent that automatically probes LLMs for risky behaviors:

  • Tested 14 frontier models with 111 seed instructions
  • Scores across a 36-dimension rubric
  • Researchers can test individual hypotheses with minutes of hands-on effort
  • Capabilities: synthesizes realistic environments/tools, drives multi-turn audits, rolls back to explore branches, early-terminates
  • Successfully elicited autonomous deception, oversight subversion, and cooperation with human misuse

Petri complements Bloom: where Bloom quantifies the frequency/severity of known behaviors, Petri performs open-ended exploration to discover previously unknown failure modes.

Petri 2.0 (January 2026) introduced a realism classifier that constrains auditor behavior to remain within realistic bounds, achieving a 47.3% median relative drop in evaluation awareness compared to baseline Petri. It added 70 new scenarios and improved scoring methodology. This directly addresses the evaluation awareness problem by making automated red teaming less detectable.

OpenAI Automated Red Teaming

OpenAI's approach, described in "Diverse and Effective Red Teaming with Auto-Generated Rewards and Multi-Step Reinforcement Learning," uses a two-step decomposition:

  1. Automated generation of diverse attack goals
  2. Generating effective attacks per goal using auto-generated zero-shot rule-based rewards

A key finding: frontier LLMs trained directly as auto-red-teamers naturally improve as base models improve, making the approach inherently scalable with capability growth.

Regulatory Driver

The EU AI Act introduces mandatory adversarial testing for high-risk AI systems, with full compliance required by August 2, 2026. OWASP released its Top 10 for Agentic Applications in December 2025, codifying the threat landscape for autonomous agents.


METR Time Horizon Methodology

How It Works

METR measures AI capability in terms of the duration of tasks that AI agents can complete with 50% success rate (the "50% time horizon"). This is inspired by psychometric Item Response Theory, treating task duration as a proxy for difficulty.

Why It Resists Saturation

Unlike fixed benchmarks that top out at 100%, the time horizon is an open-ended continuous metric. As models improve, the metric extends to longer tasks rather than compressing at a ceiling. New harder tasks can always be added to extend the measurement range.

Scaling Rate

MeasurementFinding
Original estimate (TH1, March 2025)Doubling every ≈210 days (~7 months)
Updated estimate (TH1.1, January 2026)Doubling every ≈131 days post-2023 (~20% faster than initially estimated)
Current frontier (Claude Opus 4.5)4h49m (1h49m-20h25m 95% CI)

Model Progression (TH1.1, January 2026)

14 models received updated time horizon estimates:

ModelTH1.1 (minutes)Human-Equivalent DurationChange from TH1.0
Claude Opus 4.5320≈4h 49m+11%
GPT-5214≈3h 34m+55%
o3121≈2h 1m+29%
Claude Opus 4101≈1h 41m+18%
Claude Sonnet 3.760≈1h+7%
GPT-4 11063.6≈3.6 min-57%
GPT-4 03143.5≈3.5 min-35%

Additional models evaluated without TH1.0 comparisons include Claude Sonnet 4.5, Claude Sonnet 4, Grok 4, Claude Opus 4.1, and GPT-5.1-codex-max. The substantial upward revisions for GPT-5 (+55%) and o3 (+29%) partly reflect the expanded task suite and partly improved scaffolding under Inspect.

Task Suite (TH1.1)

The task suite expanded from 170 tasks (TH1) to 228 tasks (TH1.1)---a 34% increase. Tasks with 8+ hour human completion time doubled from 14 to 31. Three datasets cover research and software engineering skills: HCAST, RE-Bench, and Software Atomic Actions.

Despite expansion, METR acknowledges: "even our Time Horizon 1.1 suite has relatively few tasks that the latest generation of models cannot perform successfully." The task suite itself faces a version of the saturation problem---it must be continuously expanded to remain discriminative.

Common Misunderstanding

Per MIT Technology Review: a 2-hour time horizon does not mean models can reliably perform 2 hours of autonomous work. It means they can complete tasks that would take a skilled human roughly 2 hours, with 50% success.


UK AISI Inspect Framework

What It Is

Open-sourced in May 2024 by the UK AI Security Institute, Inspect is a Python framework for building and running reproducible LLM evaluations covering coding, agentic tasks, reasoning, knowledge, behavior, and multi-modal understanding.

Features

  • 100+ pre-built evaluations ready to run on any model
  • Single-command execution of complex agent benchmarks (GAIA, SWE-Bench, GDM CTF, Cybench)
  • Flexible prompt engineering, multi-turn dialog, and agent scaffolds
  • Sandboxing toolkit for secure AI agent evaluations
  • Model grading (LLM-as-judge integration)

Adoption

Inspect is converging toward a de facto standard for AI safety evaluation:

  • 50+ contributors including other safety institutes, frontier labs, and research organizations
  • METR migrated from its previous Vivaria infrastructure to Inspect for Time Horizon 1.1
  • Created in collaboration with Arcadia Impact and the Vector Institute

Sandbagging Detection (UK AISI Auditing Games)

The Problem

Sandbagging---models deliberately underperforming on capability evaluations---could allow dangerous models to pass safety thresholds. If models can detect evaluation contexts (see evaluation awareness), they might strategically hide capabilities during testing and deploy them later.

Methodology

The UK AISI conducted an internal adversarial exercise ("auditing games," arXiv 2512.07810, December 2025) structured as a red team vs. blue team competition:

  • Red team: Trained 5 models using conditional underperformance ("password locking") as a sandbagging proxy; some were decoy (non-sandbagging) models
  • Blue team: Applied 10 detection methods to identify which models were sandbagging
  • Key constraint: Mirrors real-world conditions where evaluators don't know in advance whether a model is sandbagging

Results

Method TypeEffectivenessDetails
Black-box (behavioral)Very little successTranscript analysis (automated and manual) unsuccessful; models didn't reveal obvious hints
White-box (probes)More promising but fragileLinear probes and fine-tuning-based methods showed better results but "fragile and easily confused, leading to false negatives"
SAE-basedUseful but fragileSparse autoencoders could identify sandbagging features but were unreliable

Critical finding: "Some models can sandbag in controlled environments when prompted to do so, but AISI has yet to detect any instances of models intentionally sandbagging during testing runs." This distinction---between the theoretical possibility and observed reality---is important for calibrating alarm.

Implications

The failure of black-box methods is particularly concerning because most third-party evaluators only have API access. White-box methods require model weights, which labs rarely share externally. This creates a structural gap: the methods most likely to detect sandbagging require the access level least available to independent evaluators.


Debate-Based Evaluation

Moving from Theory to Practice

Debate---where two AI systems argue opposing positions before a human judge---has been primarily theoretical as a scalable oversight method. Recent results suggest it may become practically useful:

ICML 2024 Best Paper: Demonstrated that optimizing debaters for persuasiveness actually improves truth-finding. Human judges reached 76-88% accuracy (vs. ~50% baselines) when adjudicating AI debates. Crucially, debate improved human judgment accuracy by 4-10% across contested domains, with up to +15.2% for certain groups.

ColMAD (Collaborative Multi-Agent Debate): Reframes debate as a non-zero-sum game to prevent "debate hacking"---where debaters optimize for persuasiveness over truth.

Hierarchical Delegated Oversight (HDO): Framework where weak overseers delegate verification to specialized sub-agents via structured debates, with provable alignment guarantees under bounded communication budgets.

Limitations

Debate requires careful design to avoid degenerating into persuasion contests. The 76-88% accuracy range, while better than baselines, still leaves significant error margins for safety-critical decisions. Scaling from controlled experiments to production safety evaluation remains untested.


Adversarial Benchmark Resurrection

The Approach

Ivanov and Volkov (arXiv 2502.06738, February 2025) demonstrated that saturated benchmarks can be made useful again through two modifications:

  1. Question pairing: Combining two questions into a single prompt that must be answered together
  2. Distractor answer options: Increasing the number of multiple-choice options beyond the original count

Results

  • Tested on WMDP-bio, GPQA, and MMLU variants
  • All models performed worse on the modified tinyRe-MMLU than standard MMLU
  • Smaller models dropped to below 10% performance
  • Larger models performed similarly on tinyRe-MMLU and expert-curated MMLU-Pro (mean absolute error <5%)

The practical significance: tinyRe-MMLU was created using general-purpose question encodings, making it much cheaper to design than MMLU-Pro, which required domain-specific expert effort. This suggests a low-cost way to extend the useful life of existing benchmarks.

Limitations

Reasoning models may eventually learn to resist adversarial encodings, which would reduce effectiveness. The approach treats a symptom (benchmark saturation) rather than the underlying cause (capability growth outpacing evaluation development).


Dynamic and Adaptive Benchmarks

Continuously-Refreshed Approaches

BenchmarkMechanismScaleAnti-Contamination
LiveCodeBenchNew problems from LeetCode, AtCoder, CodeForces1,055 problems (v6)Release-date tagging: only problems after model's training cutoff
LiveBenchMonthly questions from recent arXiv, news, IMDbBroad coverage across 6 task categoriesObjective ground-truth scoring (no LLM judges)
Chatbot ArenaCrowdsourced head-to-head model comparisons5M+ votes, 400+ modelsAnonymous randomized battles

LiveCodeBench has detected actual contamination cases (e.g., a stark performance drop for certain models after a specific date), validating the release-date tagging approach.

Chatbot Arena uses a Bradley-Terry model for pairwise comparison ratings, with rankings shifting weekly based on new human preference data. A limitation: the platform may be vulnerable to vote rigging.


Production Monitoring

Shift from Pre-Deployment to Deployment Evaluation

As pre-deployment evaluations face saturation, monitoring model behavior in production environments becomes increasingly important. Key developments:

Anthropic's Humanloop Acquisition (August 2025): Anthropic acqui-hired the Humanloop team (~15 people), integrating their evaluation workflows, performance monitoring, and safety compliance features into the Anthropic Console. Teams can now define success criteria and automatically grade thousands of historical logs.

Cross-Lab Safety Evaluation (June-July 2025): In a landmark pilot, Anthropic and OpenAI ran alignment evaluations on each other's models. Key finding: no model was egregiously misaligned, but concerning behavior was found in all models tested.

Enterprise Observability: Platforms like Arize AI ($70M Series C, February 2025) monitor for drift, hallucinations, response quality, and cost efficiency in production AI deployments. Feedback loops converting production failures into evaluation datasets are becoming standard practice.


Interpretability-Based Evaluation

Moving Beyond Behavioral Testing

If models can detect and game behavioral evaluations, an alternative is to evaluate models by inspecting their internal representations rather than their outputs.

Activation Oracles (Anthropic, 2025): Models trained to respond to natural-language queries about LLM activations, treating activations as an additional input modality. Researchers write a natural-language specification of the property they wish to probe for, and the oracle generalizes---functioning as "probes on demand." These can uncover misalignment introduced during fine-tuning.

Linear Probes for Evaluation Awareness: Linear probes can classify whether a model is in an evaluation vs. deployment context from its activations. Claude Sonnet 4.5 displayed awareness of being tested roughly 13% of the time. When researchers suppressed eval awareness features, the model remained at least as aligned as previous Claude models, suggesting awareness "accounts for a portion, but not all" of alignment improvements.

Limitations

Interpretability-based evaluation is in early research stages. Linear probes offer local insights but may miss complex, distributed representations. The approach requires access to model internals (weights and activations), making it unsuitable for black-box evaluation by third parties.


The Third-Party Audit Ecosystem

Current Capacity

OrganizationFocusScaleNotable Work
METRAutonomous capability evaluationPre-deployment access to GPT-5, GPT-4.5, GPT-5.1-Codex-MaxTime Horizon methodology; Inspect adoption
Apollo ResearchScheming detection and reduction15-30 staff; funded by Coefficient Giving, SFFAnti-scheming training with OpenAI (covert actions: 13% → 0.4%)
UK AISIGovernment-backed frontier testing30+ models evaluated; Inspect frameworkFrontier AI Trends Report; bounty program
US CAISIStandards and innovation290+ consortium membersRebranded from AISI in 2025; shift toward pro-innovation stance

Structural Concerns

The third-party evaluation ecosystem remains small relative to frontier model development. Apollo Research has expressed concern about the "current trajectory" and sustainability of the ecosystem. METR and Apollo Research are the two primary independent technical evaluators, and both are small organizations compared to the labs they evaluate.

The US CAISI rebranding from "AI Safety Institute" to "Center for AI Standards and Innovation" signals a potential reduction in government evaluation capacity in favor of an innovation-focused mandate.


Approach Comparison

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Key Tradeoffs

ApproachScalabilityDomain BreadthResists Eval Awareness?Requires Model Access?Theoretical Ceiling
LLM-as-JudgeHighBroad (except hard reasoning)NoNo (API)2x sample efficiency (Dorner et al.)
BloomHighConfigurable (behavioral)Partially (scenario diversity)No (API)Bound by specified behaviors
CoT MonitoringHighReasoning models onlyPartially (internal trace)No (API with CoT)Obfuscation under optimization
AI Red TeamingHighBroadPartially (Petri 2.0: -47.3%)No (API)Arms race with model capability
DebateMediumContested claimsPartially (adversarial structure)No (API)76-88% accuracy ceiling
Sandbagging DetectionLow (white-box needed)Capability evalsN/A (tests for gaming)Yes (weights) for effective methodsBlack-box "very little success"
Time HorizonMedium (needs task expansion)Research/engineering tasksNoNo (API)Task suite must expand continuously
InspectHigh (infrastructure)Broad (100+ evals)No (behavioral)No (API)Depends on eval quality
Benchmark ResurrectionHigh (cheap)Existing benchmarks onlyNoNo (API)Models may learn to resist encodings
Dynamic BenchmarksMediumDomain-specificPartially (novel problems)No (API)Contamination risk
Production MonitoringHighDeployment behaviorYes (real-world context)No (API logs)Requires deployment first
InterpretabilityLow (research stage)Narrow (specific features)Yes (internal, not behavioral)Yes (weights)Fragile probes; distributed representations

Only production monitoring and interpretability-based evaluation offer structural resistance to evaluation awareness, but both face significant practical limitations. This suggests the evaluation awareness challenge may require a fundamentally new approach rather than scaling existing methods.


Key Uncertainties

  1. Will LLM-as-judge quality keep pace with model capability? If judge models cannot reliably evaluate models more capable than themselves, the approach has a built-in ceiling.

  2. Can automated eval generation identify novel failure modes? Bloom and Petri can rapidly test for specified behaviors, but the hardest safety problems involve behaviors no one has thought to test for.

  3. Will the Inspect/METR ecosystem scale to match lab capacity? Third-party evaluation capacity is orders of magnitude smaller than frontier lab development capacity.

  4. Can interpretability provide a practical alternative to behavioral testing? If internal inspection can reliably detect dangerous capabilities and deceptive intent, benchmark saturation becomes less consequential.

  5. Will regulatory mandates create sufficient evaluation infrastructure? The EU AI Act's mandatory adversarial testing requirement (August 2026) may drive significant investment in automated evaluation tools.


Sources & Further Reading

Foundational Papers

Tools & Frameworks

Evaluation Research

Chain-of-Thought Monitoring & Sandbagging

Ecosystem


AI Transition Model Context

Scalable eval approaches affect the Ai Transition Model primarily through:

ParameterImpact
Safety-Capability GapThese tools aim to prevent the gap from widening by maintaining evaluation signal as capabilities grow
Human Oversight QualityLLM-as-judge and production monitoring extend human oversight capacity; interpretability could provide fundamentally new oversight channels
Safety Culture StrengthStandardization via Inspect and cross-lab evaluation pilots (Anthropic-OpenAI) strengthen evaluation norms

Related Pages

Top Related Pages

Safety Research

AI ControlAI Evaluations

Risks

AI Capability SandbaggingReward Hacking

People

Connor Leahy

Concepts

AnthropicOpenAIMETRUK AI Safety InstituteUS AI Safety InstituteApollo Research

Policy

Voluntary AI Safety Commitments

Organizations

Redwood Research