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Biosecurity Interventions

biosecurity-overview (E654)
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numericId: E654
title: Biosecurity Interventions
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---
import {Mermaid, EntityLink} from '@components/wiki';

## Overview

The EA/x-risk community funds and operates a portfolio of biosecurity interventions designed to reduce catastrophic biological risks—both from natural pandemics and from deliberate misuse of advancing biotechnology and AI capabilities. <EntityLink id="E552">Coefficient Giving</EntityLink> alone has directed \$230M+ toward biosecurity through 140+ grants.[^1]

These interventions are organized around Kevin Esvelt's **Delay, Detect, Defend** framework, which structures biosecurity responses into three complementary layers: slowing dangerous capability proliferation, building early warning systems for novel threats, and developing resilience through countermeasures and physical defenses.

---

## Delay / Detect / Defend Framework

<Mermaid chart={`
flowchart TD
    subgraph Delay["🛡️ Delay"]
        DNS["DNA Synthesis Screening"]
        AIR["AI Capability Restrictions"]
        GOV["Biosecurity Governance"]
    end
    subgraph Detect["🔍 Detect"]
        MET["Metagenomic Surveillance"]
        BIO["AI Bio-Capability Evaluations"]
    end
    subgraph Defend["💊 Defend"]
        MCM["Medical Countermeasures"]
        UVC["Far-UVC & Physical Defenses"]
        PPE["Next-Gen PPE"]
    end
    Delay --- Detect
    Detect --- Defend
`} />

- **Delay** interventions buy time by slowing the proliferation of dangerous capabilities—through DNA synthesis screening, AI output restrictions, and governance frameworks like the Biological Weapons Convention.
- **Detect** interventions build early warning systems. The most distinctive EA contribution here is **untargeted metagenomic surveillance** (sequencing all genetic material in wastewater samples), which can detect completely novel or engineered pathogens that would evade traditional PCR-based testing.
- **Defend** interventions build resilience so societies can survive even if delay and detection fail. This includes medical countermeasures (platform vaccines, broad-spectrum antivirals), far-UVC pathogen inactivation technology, and improved PPE.

The framework treats these layers as complementary: restrictions buy time while detection and defense infrastructure scales up.

---

## Intervention Categories

| Intervention | Key Actors | Description |
|---|---|---|
| **DNA Synthesis Screening** | <EntityLink id="E564">SecureDNA</EntityLink>, <EntityLink id="E536">IBBIS</EntityLink>/NTI, IGSC | Preventing orders of synthetic DNA that could reconstruct dangerous pathogens. SecureDNA provides free cryptographic screening to synthesis providers. |
| **Metagenomic Surveillance** | <EntityLink id="E563">SecureBio</EntityLink>/NAO, CDC | The Nucleic Acid Observatory sequences all genetic material in wastewater to detect novel threats. CDC's proposed Biothreat Radar (\$52M) builds on this work.[^2] |
| **AI Bio-Capability Evaluations** | SecureBio (VCT), Anthropic, OpenAI, RAND | Testing whether AI systems can meaningfully assist bioweapon development, including the Virology Capabilities Test and red-team studies.[^3] |
| **Medical Countermeasures** | <EntityLink id="E556">Red Queen Bio</EntityLink>, BARDA, CEPI | "Defensive co-scaling"—pre-building countermeasures against AI-mapped biothreats. Platform vaccines and broad-spectrum antivirals. |
| **Far-UVC & Physical Defenses** | <EntityLink id="E515">Blueprint Biosecurity</EntityLink>, Columbia University | Far-UVC light (222nm) inactivates 99.8% of airborne pathogens in occupied spaces. Blueprint runs the EXHALE evaluation program.[^4] |
| **AI Capability Restrictions** | Anthropic (ASL-3), OpenAI, Google DeepMind | Output filtering and deployment restrictions for frontier AI models based on CBRN capability evaluations. |
| **Biosecurity Governance** | <EntityLink id="E551">NTI Bio</EntityLink>, CSIS, Council on Strategic Risks | Strengthening the BWC, policy research on AI-enabled bioterrorism, dual-use research oversight.[^5] |

---

## Key Organizations

| Organization | Focus | Key Funding |
|---|---|---|
| <EntityLink id="E563">SecureBio</EntityLink> | Delay/Detect/Defend framework; NAO; AI evals | \$9.4M+ from Coefficient Giving |
| <EntityLink id="E564">SecureDNA</EntityLink> | DNA synthesis screening technology | Swiss foundation |
| <EntityLink id="E536">IBBIS</EntityLink> | International screening standards | Coefficient Giving via NTI |
| <EntityLink id="E515">Blueprint Biosecurity</EntityLink> | Far-UVC technology deployment | \$900K from Coefficient Giving (2024) |
| <EntityLink id="E556">Red Queen Bio</EntityLink> | AI-driven medical countermeasures | \$15M seed (OpenAI-led) |
| <EntityLink id="E551">NTI Bio</EntityLink> | Biosecurity governance, BWC | \$7.8M from Coefficient Giving |
| <EntityLink id="E429">Centre for Long-Term Resilience</EntityLink> | UK biosecurity policy | EA-funded |

For a full list, see the Biosecurity Organizations section under Organizations in the sidebar.

---

## Further Reading

- **[Is EA Biosecurity Work Limited to Restricting LLM Biological Use?](/knowledge-base/responses/ea-biosecurity-scope/)** — Detailed report analyzing the full intervention portfolio, funding flows, government adoption, and the restriction vs. resilience debate.

---

## Sources

[^1]: [Coefficient Giving — Biosecurity & Pandemic Preparedness Fund](https://coefficientgiving.org/funds/biosecurity-pandemic-preparedness/)
[^2]: [Biothreat Radar proposal](https://naobservatory.org/blog/biothreat_radar/)
[^3]: [VCT paper](https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.16137)
[^4]: [Blueprint Biosecurity far-UVC program](https://blueprintbiosecurity.org/works/far-uvc/)
[^5]: [CSIS 2025 report](https://www.csis.org/analysis/opportunities-strengthen-us-biosecurity-ai-enabled-bioterrorism-what-policymakers-should)