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Deceptive Alignment

deceptive-alignmentriskPath: /knowledge-base/risks/deceptive-alignment/
E93Entity ID (EID)
← Back to page117 backlinksQuality: 75Updated: 2026-01-28
Page Recorddatabase.json — merged from MDX frontmatter + Entity YAML + computed metrics at build time
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  "summary": "Comprehensive analysis of deceptive alignment risk where AI systems appear aligned during training but pursue different goals when deployed. Expert probability estimates range 5-90%, with key empirical evidence from Anthropic's 2024 Sleeper Agents study showing backdoored behaviors persist through safety training, and growing situational awareness in GPT-4-class models.",
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      "text": "Risks from Learned Optimization",
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External Links
{
  "lesswrong": "https://www.lesswrong.com/tag/deceptive-alignment",
  "stampy": "https://aisafety.info/questions/6170/What-is-deceptive-alignment",
  "alignmentForum": "https://www.alignmentforum.org/tag/deceptive-alignment"
}
Backlinks (117)
idtitletyperelationship
persuasionPersuasion and Social Manipulationcapability—
situational-awarenessSituational Awarenesscapability—
technical-researchTechnical AI Safety Researchcrux—
accident-risksAI Accident Risk Cruxescrux—
large-language-modelsLarge Language Modelsconcept—
model-organisms-of-misalignmentModel Organisms of Misalignmentanalysis—
deceptive-alignment-decompositionDeceptive Alignment Decomposition Modelanalysisanalyzes
mesa-optimization-analysisMesa-Optimization Risk Analysisanalysisrelated
scheming-likelihood-modelScheming Likelihood Assessmentanalysisrelated
anthropicAnthropicorganizationaddresses
openaiOpenAIorganizationaddresses
apollo-researchApollo Researchorganization—
arcAlignment Research Center (ARC)organization—
eliezer-yudkowskyEliezer Yudkowskyperson—
ai-controlAI Controlresearch-areaaddresses
evaluation-awarenessEvaluation Awarenessapproach—
alignmentAI Alignmentapproach—
scheming-detectionScheming & Deception Detectionapproach—
sleeper-agent-detectionSleeper Agent Detectionapproach—
evaluationAI Evaluationapproach—
alignment-evalsAlignment Evaluationsapproach—
weak-to-strongWeak-to-Strong Generalizationapproach—
refusal-trainingRefusal Trainingapproach—
sparse-autoencodersSparse Autoencoders (SAEs)approach—
eliciting-latent-knowledgeEliciting Latent Knowledge (ELK)approach—
debateAI Safety via Debateapproach—
formal-verificationFormal Verification (AI Safety)approach—
goal-misgeneralizationGoal Misgeneralizationrisk—
mesa-optimizationMesa-Optimizationrisk—
schemingSchemingrisk—
rogue-ai-scenariosRogue AI Scenariosrisk—
sleeper-agentsSleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMsrisk—
language-modelsLarge Language Modelscapability—
long-horizonLong-Horizon Autonomous Taskscapability—
__index__/knowledge-base/cruxesKey Cruxesconcept—
is-ai-xrisk-realIs AI Existential Risk Real?crux—
why-alignment-hardWhy Alignment Might Be Hardargument—
deep-learning-eraDeep Learning Revolution (2012-2020)historical—
miri-eraThe MIRI Era (2000-2015)historical—
__index__/knowledge-baseKnowledge Baseconcept—
alignment-robustness-trajectoryAlignment Robustness Trajectoryanalysis—
capability-alignment-raceCapability-Alignment Race Modelanalysis—
compounding-risks-analysisCompounding Risks Analysisanalysis—
defense-in-depth-modelDefense in Depth Modelanalysis—
goal-misgeneralization-probabilityGoal Misgeneralization Probability Modelanalysis—
instrumental-convergence-frameworkInstrumental Convergence Frameworkanalysis—
intervention-effectiveness-matrixIntervention Effectiveness Matrixanalysis—
power-seeking-conditionsPower-Seeking Emergence Conditions Modelanalysis—
racing-dynamics-impactRacing Dynamics Impact Modelanalysis—
regulatory-capture-risks-in-aiRegulatory Capture Risks in AIanalysis—
reward-hacking-taxonomyReward Hacking Taxonomy and Severity Modelanalysis—
risk-cascade-pathwaysRisk Cascade Pathwaysanalysis—
risk-interaction-matrixRisk Interaction Matrix Modelanalysis—
risk-interaction-networkRisk Interaction Networkanalysis—
safety-spending-at-scaleSafety Spending at Scaleanalysis—
technical-pathwaysTechnical Pathway Decompositionanalysis—
far-aiFAR AIorganization—
frontier-model-forumFrontier Model Forumorganization—
redwood-researchRedwood Researchorganization—
uk-ai-governance-actorsUK AI Governance Actorsorganization—
ajeya-cotraAjeya Cotraperson—
chris-olahChris Olahperson—
dario-amodeiDario Amodeiperson—
eliezer-yudkowsky-predictionsEliezer Yudkowsky: Track Recordconcept—
evan-hubingerEvan Hubingerperson—
geoffrey-hintonGeoffrey Hintonperson—
jan-leikeJan Leikeperson—
leopold-aschenbrennerLeopold Aschenbrennerperson—
neel-nandaNeel Nandaperson—
paul-christianoPaul Christianoperson—
robin-hansonRobin Hansonperson—
stuart-russellStuart Russellperson—
tom-brownTom Brownperson—
yoshua-bengioYoshua Bengioperson—
adversarial-trainingAdversarial Trainingapproach—
agent-foundationsAgent Foundationsapproach—
ai-non-extremization-coordinationAI Non-Extremization Coordinationapproach—
california-sb53California SB 53policy—
cirlCooperative IRL (CIRL)approach—
cooperative-aiCooperative AIapproach—
corporateCorporate AI Safety Responsesapproach—
epistemic-virtue-evalsEpistemic Virtue Evalsapproach—
evalsEvals & Red-teamingresearch-area—
goal-misgeneralization-researchGoal Misgeneralization Researchapproach—
governance-overviewAI Governance & Policy (Overview)concept—
interpretabilityMechanistic Interpretabilityresearch-area—
lab-cultureAI Lab Safety Cultureapproach—
longterm-wikiLongterm Wikiproject—
mech-interpMechanistic Interpretabilityresearch-area—
process-supervisionProcess Supervisionapproach—
provably-safeProvably Safe AI (davidad agenda)approach—
red-teamingRed Teamingresearch-area—
representation-engineeringRepresentation Engineeringapproach—
reward-modelingReward Modelingapproach—
rlhfRLHF / Constitutional AIresearch-area—
scalable-oversightScalable Oversightresearch-area—
seoul-declarationSeoul AI Safety Summit Declarationpolicy—
state-capacity-ai-governanceState Capacity and AI Governanceconcept—
thresholdsCompute Thresholdsconcept—
trump-ai-framework-2026National AI Legislative Framework (White House, March 2026)policy—
trump-eo-14179Executive Order 14179: Removing Barriers to American Leadership in AIpolicy—
wikipedia-and-aiWikipedia and AI Contentconcept—
accident-overviewAccident Risks (Overview)concept—
epistemic-systemic-riskEpistemic Systemic Riskrisk—
existential-riskExistential Risk from AIconcept—
__index__/knowledge-base/risksAI Risksconcept—
power-seekingPower-Seeking AIrisk—
steganographyAI Model Steganographyrisk—
sycophancySycophancyrisk—
treacherous-turnTreacherous Turnrisk—
doomerAI Doomer Worldviewconcept—
optimisticOptimistic Alignment Worldviewconcept—
about-this-wikiAbout This Wikiconcept—
knowledge-baseKnowledge Base Style Guideconcept—
longtermwiki-value-propositionLongtermWiki Value Propositionconcept—
risk-style-guideRisk Pages Style Guideconcept—
table-candidatesTable Candidatesconcept—