Longterm Wiki
Updated 2026-02-05HistoryData
Page StatusContent
Edited 8 days ago1.1k words
55
QualityAdequate
70
ImportanceHigh
10
Structure10/15
304200%13%
Updated every 6 weeksDue in 5 weeks

Biosecurity Organizations

Organization

Biosecurity Organizations

Overview and comparison of organizations working on biosecurity and pandemic preparedness relevant to AI-era biological risks. Open Philanthropy has directed over $90M to organizations in this set alone, making it the dominant funder in EA-aligned biosecurity.

1.1k words

Overview

The biosecurity organizational landscape relevant to AI-era risks spans established institutions with decades of policy influence, EA-funded startups building novel technical infrastructure, and traditional international partnerships operating at billion-dollar scale. These organizations collectively address the growing convergence of AI capabilities and biological risks through approaches ranging from DNA synthesis screening to pathogen surveillance to vaccine development.

The funding landscape is heavily shaped by Coefficient Giving, which has directed over $90M to organizations in this set. Outside EA, CEPI operates at a fundamentally different scale ($760M+ raised, $3.5B five-year plan) but focuses primarily on natural pandemic threats rather than deliberate misuse.

Identity and Approach

OrganizationFoundedApproachThreat FocusKey Output
JHU CHS1998Detect, GovernanceBothEvent 201 pandemic simulation; WHO Collaborating Centre
CEPI2017DefendNatural8 authorized COVID vaccines; 100 Days Mission
NTI | bio≈2016Delay, GovernanceBothSpawned IBBIS; Global Health Security Index
SecureBio2022Delay, Detect, DefendAI-enabledVirology Capabilities Test (VCT); Nucleic Acid Observatory
SecureDNA2022DelayDeliberateCryptographic DNA screening at 30bp (exceeds US requirements)
CLTR≈2021GovernanceBothUK MoD AI Strategy influence; Biological Security Strategy input
Blueprint Biosecurity2023DefendNatural + deliberate266-page far-UVC Blueprint; EXHALE research grants
IBBIS2024Delay, GovernanceDeliberateCommon Mechanism open-source screening tool
1Day Sooner2020Defend, GovernanceNaturalUK COVID challenge trial advocacy; air safety report
CSR2017GovernanceSystemicMiRCH climate-military tracker; systemic risk briefings
Red Queen Bio2025DefendAI-enabledNone yet (launched Nov 2025)

Approach uses SecureBio's Delay/Detect/Defend framework plus Governance. Threat Focus distinguishes natural pandemics, deliberate/engineered threats, and AI-enabled biological risks.

Funding and Assessment

OrganizationEA FundingOP FundingNon-EA FundingImpactPromise
JHU CHS>$40M>$40M>$23M (CDC, Sloan, DoD)AB+
CEPI$0$0$760M+ (govts, Gates, Wellcome)AB
NTI | bio>$29M>$29MParent NTI: $250M (Turner)A-B+
SecureBio≈$9.4M≈$9.4MMinimal identifiedB+A-
SecureDNAIndirect (via SecureBio)IndirectPrivate philanthropy (US, EU, China)BB+
CLTR≈$8M+≈$5MPrivate foundationsBB+
Blueprint Biosecurity≈$2M≈$1.85M≈$250K (Vanguard Charitable)C+B+
IBBIS$3M (Founders Pledge)$0 directParis Peace Forum supportC+B
1Day Sooner≈$7.8M≈$5.6M≈$5M (Schmidt, Packard, etc.)C+B-
CSR$0$0≈$3.7M (MacArthur, Mertz Gilmore)CC
Red Queen Bio$0$0$15M (OpenAI-led seed round)DB

EA Funding includes Coefficient Giving, Founders Pledge, Survival and Flourishing Fund, EA Infrastructure Fund, and Emergent Ventures. Impact reflects demonstrated achievements to date. Promise reflects potential given positioning, approach, and resources. Both use A (highest) through F (lowest).

Rating Rationale

  • A/A- impact: JHU CHS (25+ years of policy influence, Event 201, WHO Collaborating Centre), CEPI (8 authorized COVID vaccines, est. 2.7M deaths averted), NTI | bio (spawned IBBIS, GHS Index, Bio Funders Compact)
  • B+/B impact: SecureBio (VCT adopted by major AI labs, NAO monitoring 31 sites), SecureDNA (deployed cryptographic screening exceeding US requirements), CLTR (documented UK policy wins on small budget)
  • C+/C impact: Blueprint (impressive research output but young), IBBIS (Common Mechanism deployed but only 15% provider adoption), 1Day Sooner (UK challenge trial success, broad portfolio), CSR (traditional think tank, biosecurity not primary focus)
  • D impact: Red Queen Bio (launched Nov 2025, no demonstrated output yet)
  • A- promise: SecureBio (unique position at AI-bio intersection, VCT becoming industry standard)
  • B+ promise: JHU CHS, NTI | bio, SecureDNA, CLTR, Blueprint (each has strong positioning with different risk profiles)
  • B promise: CEPI (mature but structural tensions on equity), IBBIS (addresses critical gap), Red Queen Bio (novel thesis, OpenAI backing, but unproven)

Coefficient Giving Concentration

Coefficient Giving is the dominant funder in EA-aligned biosecurity. Six of the eleven organizations receive OP funding, and for several it constitutes the majority of their budget:

OrganizationOP Funding% of Org's TotalGrant Period
JHU CHS>$40M≈65%2017-2023
NTI | bio>$29MLarge majority2018-2023
SecureBio≈$9.4M≈100%2022-2023
1Day Sooner≈$5.6M≈44%Ongoing
CLTR≈$5M≈50%2024
Blueprint Biosecurity≈$1.85M≈82%2023-2024
Total identified>$90M

This concentration creates both strength (coordinated strategy) and risk (single point of funding failure). SecureBio derives nearly 100% of identified funding from Coefficient Giving.

Two organizations operate entirely outside the EA funding ecosystem:

  • CEPI: $760M+ from governments and traditional philanthropy. Dwarfs all EA biosecurity funding combined.
  • Red Queen Bio: $15M seed round led by OpenAI — the first major AI lab direct investment in biosecurity infrastructure.

Notable Patterns

Synthesis screening convergence: Three organizations work on DNA synthesis screening with complementary approaches — SecureDNA (cryptographic privacy-preserving tool), IBBIS (open-source Common Mechanism + international standards), and NTI | bio (governance advocacy). IBBIS was originally incubated within NTI | bio.

AI lab engagement: The biosecurity field is seeing growing direct engagement from AI labs. OpenAI led Red Queen Bio's $15M seed round. SecureBio's VCT is used by major AI labs for pre-release safety evaluations. JHU CHS has convened meetings with OpenAI, Anthropic, DeepMind, and others on AIxBio risks.

Age vs. demonstrated impact: The oldest organization (JHU CHS, 1998) has the clearest demonstrated impact, while the newest (Red Queen Bio, 2025) has the most novel thesis but no output yet. This expected pattern makes "promise" ratings more speculative for newer organizations.

Far-UVC convergence: Both Blueprint Biosecurity and 1Day Sooner work on far-UVC/indoor air quality from different angles — Blueprint through comprehensive research and deployment blueprints, 1Day Sooner through policy advocacy and cost-effectiveness analysis with Rethink Priorities.

Key Uncertainties

Key Questions

  • ?How would an Coefficient Giving funding reduction affect the biosecurity landscape, given that multiple organizations derive 50-100% of funding from OP?
  • ?Will AI lab direct investment in biosecurity (like OpenAI's Red Queen Bio investment) become a significant funding stream, or was this an isolated case?
  • ?Can DNA synthesis screening achieve near-universal adoption before benchtop synthesizers make centralized screening obsolete?
  • ?Is the current organizational landscape adequate for AI-enabled biological threats, or are there critical capability gaps that existing organizations don't address?
  • ?How should the field balance natural pandemic preparedness (CEPI's focus) with deliberate misuse prevention (the EA biosecurity focus)?

Related Pages

Top Related Pages

Approaches

Biosecurity Interventions

Analysis

Is EA Biosecurity Work Limited to Restricting LLM Biological Use?

Concepts

Johns Hopkins Center for Health SecurityNTI | bio (Nuclear Threat Initiative - Biological Program)SecureBioSecureDNACentre for Long-Term ResilienceIBBIS (International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science)

Organizations

Blueprint Biosecurity