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Biosecurity Organizations

biosecurity-orgs-overview (E638)
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Frontmatter
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---
numericId: E638
title: Biosecurity Organizations
description: Overview and comparison of organizations working on biosecurity and pandemic preparedness relevant to AI-era biological risks. Open Philanthropy has directed over $90M to organizations in this set alone, making it the dominant funder in EA-aligned biosecurity.
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lastEdited: "2026-02-05"
importance: 70
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ratings:
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subcategory: biosecurity-orgs
entityType: organization
---
import {EntityLink, KeyQuestions} from '@components/wiki';

## Overview

The biosecurity organizational landscape relevant to AI-era risks spans established institutions with decades of policy influence, EA-funded startups building novel technical infrastructure, and traditional international partnerships operating at billion-dollar scale. These organizations collectively address the growing convergence of AI capabilities and biological risks through approaches ranging from DNA synthesis screening to pathogen surveillance to vaccine development.

The funding landscape is heavily shaped by <EntityLink id="E552">Coefficient Giving</EntityLink>, which has directed over \$90M to organizations in this set. Outside EA, <EntityLink id="E520">CEPI</EntityLink> operates at a fundamentally different scale (\$760M+ raised, \$3.5B five-year plan) but focuses primarily on natural pandemic threats rather than deliberate misuse.

## Identity and Approach

| Organization | Founded | Approach | Threat Focus | Key Output |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **<EntityLink id="E423">JHU CHS</EntityLink>** | 1998 | Detect, Governance | Both | Event 201 pandemic simulation; WHO Collaborating Centre |
| **<EntityLink id="E520">CEPI</EntityLink>** | 2017 | Defend | Natural | 8 authorized COVID vaccines; 100 Days Mission |
| **<EntityLink id="E551">NTI \| bio</EntityLink>** | ≈2016 | Delay, Governance | Both | Spawned IBBIS; Global Health Security Index |
| **<EntityLink id="E563">SecureBio</EntityLink>** | 2022 | Delay, Detect, Defend | AI-enabled | Virology Capabilities Test (VCT); Nucleic Acid Observatory |
| **<EntityLink id="E564">SecureDNA</EntityLink>** | 2022 | Delay | Deliberate | Cryptographic DNA screening at 30bp (exceeds US requirements) |
| **<EntityLink id="E429">CLTR</EntityLink>** | ≈2021 | Governance | Both | UK MoD AI Strategy influence; Biological Security Strategy input |
| **<EntityLink id="E515">Blueprint Biosecurity</EntityLink>** | 2023 | Defend | Natural + deliberate | 266-page far-UVC Blueprint; EXHALE research grants |
| **<EntityLink id="E536">IBBIS</EntityLink>** | 2024 | Delay, Governance | Deliberate | Common Mechanism open-source screening tool |
| **<EntityLink id="E509">1Day Sooner</EntityLink>** | 2020 | Defend, Governance | Natural | UK COVID challenge trial advocacy; air safety report |
| **<EntityLink id="E522">CSR</EntityLink>** | 2017 | Governance | Systemic | MiRCH climate-military tracker; systemic risk briefings |
| **<EntityLink id="E556">Red Queen Bio</EntityLink>** | 2025 | Defend | AI-enabled | None yet (launched Nov 2025) |

**Approach** uses <EntityLink id="E563">SecureBio</EntityLink>'s Delay/Detect/Defend framework plus Governance. **Threat Focus** distinguishes natural pandemics, deliberate/engineered threats, and AI-enabled biological risks.

## Funding and Assessment

| Organization | EA Funding | OP Funding | Non-EA Funding | Impact | Promise |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **<EntityLink id="E423">JHU CHS</EntityLink>** | >\$40M | >\$40M | >\$23M (CDC, Sloan, DoD) | **A** | **B+** |
| **<EntityLink id="E520">CEPI</EntityLink>** | \$0 | \$0 | \$760M+ (govts, Gates, Wellcome) | **A** | **B** |
| **<EntityLink id="E551">NTI \| bio</EntityLink>** | >\$29M | >\$29M | Parent NTI: \$250M (Turner) | **A-** | **B+** |
| **<EntityLink id="E563">SecureBio</EntityLink>** | ≈\$9.4M | ≈\$9.4M | Minimal identified | **B+** | **A-** |
| **<EntityLink id="E564">SecureDNA</EntityLink>** | Indirect (via SecureBio) | Indirect | Private philanthropy (US, EU, China) | **B** | **B+** |
| **<EntityLink id="E429">CLTR</EntityLink>** | ≈\$8M+ | ≈\$5M | Private foundations | **B** | **B+** |
| **<EntityLink id="E515">Blueprint Biosecurity</EntityLink>** | ≈\$2M | ≈\$1.85M | ≈\$250K (Vanguard Charitable) | **C+** | **B+** |
| **<EntityLink id="E536">IBBIS</EntityLink>** | \$3M (Founders Pledge) | \$0 direct | Paris Peace Forum support | **C+** | **B** |
| **<EntityLink id="E509">1Day Sooner</EntityLink>** | ≈\$7.8M | ≈\$5.6M | ≈\$5M (Schmidt, Packard, etc.) | **C+** | **B-** |
| **<EntityLink id="E522">CSR</EntityLink>** | \$0 | \$0 | ≈\$3.7M (MacArthur, Mertz Gilmore) | **C** | **C** |
| **<EntityLink id="E556">Red Queen Bio</EntityLink>** | \$0 | \$0 | \$15M (OpenAI-led seed round) | **D** | **B** |

**EA Funding** includes Coefficient Giving, Founders Pledge, Survival and Flourishing Fund, EA Infrastructure Fund, and Emergent Ventures. **Impact** reflects demonstrated achievements to date. **Promise** reflects potential given positioning, approach, and resources. Both use A (highest) through F (lowest).

### Rating Rationale

- **A/A- impact**: JHU CHS (25+ years of policy influence, Event 201, WHO Collaborating Centre), CEPI (8 authorized COVID vaccines, est. 2.7M deaths averted), NTI \| bio (spawned IBBIS, GHS Index, Bio Funders Compact)
- **B+/B impact**: SecureBio (VCT adopted by major AI labs, NAO monitoring 31 sites), SecureDNA (deployed cryptographic screening exceeding US requirements), CLTR (documented UK policy wins on small budget)
- **C+/C impact**: Blueprint (impressive research output but young), IBBIS (Common Mechanism deployed but only 15% provider adoption), 1Day Sooner (UK challenge trial success, broad portfolio), CSR (traditional think tank, biosecurity not primary focus)
- **D impact**: Red Queen Bio (launched Nov 2025, no demonstrated output yet)
- **A- promise**: SecureBio (unique position at AI-bio intersection, VCT becoming industry standard)
- **B+ promise**: JHU CHS, NTI \| bio, SecureDNA, CLTR, Blueprint (each has strong positioning with different risk profiles)
- **B promise**: CEPI (mature but structural tensions on equity), IBBIS (addresses critical gap), Red Queen Bio (novel thesis, OpenAI backing, but unproven)

## Coefficient Giving Concentration

<EntityLink id="E552">Coefficient Giving</EntityLink> is the dominant funder in EA-aligned biosecurity. Six of the eleven organizations receive OP funding, and for several it constitutes the majority of their budget:

| Organization | OP Funding | % of Org's Total | Grant Period |
|---|---|---|---|
| <EntityLink id="E423">JHU CHS</EntityLink> | >\$40M | ≈65% | 2017-2023 |
| <EntityLink id="E551">NTI \| bio</EntityLink> | >\$29M | Large majority | 2018-2023 |
| <EntityLink id="E563">SecureBio</EntityLink> | ≈\$9.4M | ≈100% | 2022-2023 |
| <EntityLink id="E509">1Day Sooner</EntityLink> | ≈\$5.6M | ≈44% | Ongoing |
| <EntityLink id="E429">CLTR</EntityLink> | ≈\$5M | ≈50% | 2024 |
| <EntityLink id="E515">Blueprint Biosecurity</EntityLink> | ≈\$1.85M | ≈82% | 2023-2024 |
| **Total identified** | **>\$90M** | | |

This concentration creates both strength (coordinated strategy) and risk (single point of funding failure). SecureBio derives nearly 100% of identified funding from Coefficient Giving.

Two organizations operate entirely outside the EA funding ecosystem:
- **CEPI**: \$760M+ from governments and traditional philanthropy. Dwarfs all EA biosecurity funding combined.
- **Red Queen Bio**: \$15M seed round led by <EntityLink id="E218">OpenAI</EntityLink> — the first major AI lab direct investment in biosecurity infrastructure.

## Notable Patterns

**Synthesis screening convergence**: Three organizations work on DNA synthesis screening with complementary approaches — <EntityLink id="E564">SecureDNA</EntityLink> (cryptographic privacy-preserving tool), <EntityLink id="E536">IBBIS</EntityLink> (open-source Common Mechanism + international standards), and <EntityLink id="E551">NTI \| bio</EntityLink> (governance advocacy). IBBIS was originally incubated within NTI \| bio.

**AI lab engagement**: The biosecurity field is seeing growing direct engagement from AI labs. <EntityLink id="E218">OpenAI</EntityLink> led Red Queen Bio's \$15M seed round. <EntityLink id="E563">SecureBio</EntityLink>'s VCT is used by major AI labs for pre-release safety evaluations. <EntityLink id="E423">JHU CHS</EntityLink> has convened meetings with OpenAI, <EntityLink id="E22">Anthropic</EntityLink>, DeepMind, and others on AIxBio risks.

**Age vs. demonstrated impact**: The oldest organization (JHU CHS, 1998) has the clearest demonstrated impact, while the newest (Red Queen Bio, 2025) has the most novel thesis but no output yet. This expected pattern makes "promise" ratings more speculative for newer organizations.

**Far-UVC convergence**: Both <EntityLink id="E515">Blueprint Biosecurity</EntityLink> and <EntityLink id="E509">1Day Sooner</EntityLink> work on far-UVC/indoor air quality from different angles — Blueprint through comprehensive research and deployment blueprints, 1Day Sooner through policy advocacy and cost-effectiveness analysis with Rethink Priorities.

## Key Uncertainties

<KeyQuestions questions={[
  "How would an Coefficient Giving funding reduction affect the biosecurity landscape, given that multiple organizations derive 50-100% of funding from OP?",
  "Will AI lab direct investment in biosecurity (like OpenAI's Red Queen Bio investment) become a significant funding stream, or was this an isolated case?",
  "Can DNA synthesis screening achieve near-universal adoption before benchtop synthesizers make centralized screening obsolete?",
  "Is the current organizational landscape adequate for AI-enabled biological threats, or are there critical capability gaps that existing organizations don't address?",
  "How should the field balance natural pandemic preparedness (CEPI's focus) with deliberate misuse prevention (the EA biosecurity focus)?",
]} />