Suggested Pages
100 pages the wiki should add, ranked by priority. Priority is based on how often the topic is mentioned across existing pages and its importance to AI safety coverage. Sourced from the Feb 2026 gap analysis.
100 of 100 results
| Why | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 100 | AI Governance | concept | 183 | Mentioned on 183 pages. Sub-topics exist (compute governance, etc.) but no umbrella page. |
| 99 | Reinforcement Learning | concept | 81 | Mentioned on 81 pages. Underpins RLHF, reward modeling, and alignment methods — no standalone page. |
| 98 | Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) | concept | 404 | Referenced on 404 pages — most-mentioned concept without a page. |
| 97 | GPT-4 | capability | 193 | Central reference point for frontier capabilities, mentioned on 193 pages. |
| 96 | Claude (Model Family) | capability | 186 | Anthropic's flagship model, mentioned on 186 pages, no standalone page. |
| 95 | Frontier Model (Concept) | concept | 161 | The concept of 'frontier model' is used on 161 pages with no definition page. |
| 94 | Training Data | concept | 111 | Fundamental topic (curation, bias, consent, copyright) — 111 page mentions. |
| 93 | Safety Evaluations | response | 106 | Referenced on 106 pages; evals are how labs demonstrate safety. |
| 92 | Misalignment Potential | ai-transition-model | 110 | 110 EntityLinks to this transition-model factor, no page exists. |
| 91 | Civilizational Competence | ai-transition-model | 104 | 104 EntityLinks to this transition-model factor, no page exists. |
| 90 | Model Evaluation (Methodology) | response | 55 | Referenced on 55 pages. Capability evals, dangerous-capability evals, eval science — no methodology page. |
| 89 | Fine-Tuning | concept | 89 | Key technique for adapting models; safety implications of open fine-tuning. |
| 88 | Gemini (Google DeepMind) | capability | 88 | Google's frontier model family, mentioned on 88 pages. |
| 87 | Llama (Meta) | capability | 82 | Most widely used open-weights model. 82 page mentions. |
| 86 | DeepSeek | organization | 71 | Chinese frontier lab (R1, V3) — changed compute-efficiency assumptions globally. |
| 85 | GPT-5 / Next-Gen OpenAI | capability | 67 | Frequently referenced as next capability milestone, 67 page mentions. |
| 84 | Transformer Architecture | concept | 65 | The architecture underlying all frontier models; no explainer page. |
| 83 | Jailbreaking & Prompt Injection | risk | 81 | Primary attack vector against deployed LLMs. Covers direct jailbreaks + indirect injection in tool-use contexts. |
| 82 | Multimodal AI | capability | 49 | Vision/audio models have distinct safety challenges. 49 mentions. |
| 81 | Training Runs & Compute Cost | concept | 47 | Economics of training — cost, duration, environmental impact. 47 mentions. |
| 80 | Foundation Model (Concept) | concept | 46 | Distinct from 'frontier model' — the general category. 46 mentions. |
| 79 | Hallucination | risk | 41 | Most user-visible AI failure mode. 41 mentions, no dedicated page. |
| 78 | AI Chips & Hardware | concept | 39 | GPU/TPU/custom silicon — hardware is a key governance lever. 39 mentions. |
| 77 | Semiconductor Industry | concept | 35 | Supply chain chokepoints (TSMC, ASML). 35 mentions. |
| 76 | Grok (xAI) | capability | 33 | xAI's model. 33 mentions; no entity or page. |
| 75 | Embeddings & Vector Search | concept | 33 | How models represent knowledge. 33 mentions. |
| 74 | AI Incidents Database | incidents | 32 | Only 2 incident pages exist. Need a comprehensive tracker. |
| 73 | Benchmarks & Leaderboards | concept | 28 | How capabilities are measured; gaming and limitations. 28 mentions. |
| 72 | Mistral AI | organization | 27 | Leading European frontier lab. Important for EU AI Act context. |
| 71 | DPO & RLHF Alternatives | response | 27 | DPO, IPO, KTO — alternatives to RLHF for alignment. 27 mentions. |
| 70 | Transition Turbulence | ai-transition-model | 26 | 26 EntityLinks to this transition-model factor, no page. |
| 69 | Synthetic Data | concept | 24 | Self-play and synthetic training data — model collapse risk. 24 mentions. |
| 68 | Model Weights (Security & Access) | concept | 40 | Referenced on 40 pages. Weight theft, open release decisions, proliferation risk — no standalone page. |
| 67 | Pre-Training | concept | 21 | The initial training phase. Distinct safety considerations from fine-tuning. |
| 66 | Knowledge Distillation | concept | 20 | Compressing large models; safety properties may not transfer. 20 mentions. |
| 65 | Post-Training (RLHF, Safety) | concept | 20 | Where safety alignment happens in practice. 20 mentions. |
| 64 | Content Provenance & C2PA | response | 19 | Technical countermeasure to deepfakes and AI content. 19 mentions. |
| 63 | Misuse Potential | ai-transition-model | 18 | 18 EntityLinks to this transition-model factor, no page. |
| 62 | AI Watermarking | response | 18 | SynthID, text watermarks — detection of AI-generated content. |
| 61 | Data Annotation & AI Labor | concept | 18 | Ghost work, RLHF annotators, labor conditions. 18 mentions. |
| 60 | Intelligence Explosion | concept | 17 | Core AI safety concept (Good, Bostrom). 17 mentions, no page. |
| 59 | Voice Cloning | risk | 17 | Fraud, impersonation, consent issues. 17 mentions. |
| 58 | Model Cards & Documentation | response | 17 | Standard disclosure format for AI models. 17 mentions. |
| 57 | Context Windows | concept | 17 | Key capability dimension (4k to 1M+) with safety implications. |
| 56 | TSMC | organization | 16 | Single point of failure for advanced chips. 16 mentions. |
| 55 | Epoch AI | organization | 16 | 16 EntityLinks to this org — key data source for AI trends. |
| 54 | Open Weights | concept | 16 | Distinct from 'open source' — weights-only release model. |
| 53 | Attention Mechanism | concept | 14 | Core transformer component. 14 mentions. |
| 52 | Capability Overhang | concept | 13 | When existing hardware can run much more capable models. 13 mentions. |
| 51 | Test-Time Compute & Reasoning | capability | 11 | o1/o3/R1 inference-scaling paradigm — changes safety assumptions. |
| 50 | Chinchilla Scaling | concept | 11 | Compute-optimal training. 11 mentions. |
| 49 | Hugging Face | organization | 10 | Central hub for open-weights models and datasets. |
| 48 | Knowledge Graphs for AI | concept | 10 | Structured knowledge + LLMs. 10 mentions. |
| 47 | Alignment Tax | concept | 9 | Cost of making models safe vs. capable. Key policy concept. |
| 46 | Image & Video Generation | capability | 16 | Diffusion models, DALL-E, Midjourney, Sora — architecture and safety issues. |
| 45 | AI Auditing | response | 9 | Third-party safety audits. Emerging profession. |
| 44 | Data Poisoning | risk | 8 | Supply-chain attack on training data. Distinct from adversarial examples. |
| 43 | Brain Emulation | concept | 8 | Whole brain emulation as alternative path to AGI. 8 mentions. |
| 42 | Algorithmic Bias | risk | 6 | 6 dangling EntityLinks. Needs entity + page. |
| 41 | Model Collapse | risk | 7 | Training on AI-generated data degrades quality. Emerging research. |
| 40 | AI Consciousness & Moral Status | concept | 7 | Sentience, moral patienthood, digital minds. 7 mentions. |
| 39 | AI Technical Standards | response | 38 | Referenced on 38 pages. ISO, NIST, IEEE frameworks — how standards interact with regulation. |
| 38 | Chain-of-Thought Reasoning | concept | 6 | Prompting technique that elicits reasoning. Safety implications. |
| 37 | Function Calling & Tool Use | capability | 6 | Agentic capability — models invoking APIs. Security concerns. |
| 36 | Differential Privacy | response | 6 | Mathematical privacy guarantees for training data. |
| 35 | Regulatory Arbitrage | risk | 5 | 5 dangling EntityLinks. Companies choosing least-regulated jurisdictions. |
| 34 | AI Liability & Legal Frameworks | response | 5 | Who pays when AI causes harm? Foundational governance question. |
| 33 | NVIDIA | organization | 4 | 4 dangling EntityLinks. Dominant AI chip supplier. |
| 32 | Compliance Costs | concept | 4 | 4 dangling EntityLinks. Cost of regulation for AI companies. |
| 31 | Chinese AI Ecosystem | concept | 4 | Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, ByteDance — different safety norms. |
| 30 | Reward Modeling | response | 3 | Positive framing of reward specification. Complements reward-hacking page. |
| 29 | Model Merging & Weight Manipulation | risk | 3 | Open-source technique to combine or modify model capabilities. |
| 28 | AI Supply Chain | concept | 3 | End-to-end: data, compute, training, deployment. Chokepoints. |
| 27 | Post-Deployment Monitoring | response | 2 | Runtime safety monitoring. Most safety work is pre-deployment. |
| 26 | Federated Learning | concept | 2 | Privacy-preserving training across distributed data. |
| 25 | AI Energy & Environmental Impact | concept | 2 | Data center power, water use, carbon footprint of training. |
| 24 | Compute Governance Tracking | metric | 2 | Are compute thresholds actually enforced? No tracking page. |
| 23 | Foundation Model Commoditization | model | 2 | Pricing collapse changes lab safety incentives. |
| 22 | In-Context Learning | concept | 2 | How LLMs learn from prompts. Safety implications for elicitation. |
| 21 | AI-Enabled Scientific Fraud | risk | 2 | Paper mills, fabricated data, fake peer reviews. |
| 20 | Speculative Decoding | concept | 1 | Inference optimization affecting deployment safety properties. |
| 19 | Shane Legg | researcher | — | DeepMind co-founder. Entity exists, no page. |
| 18 | Nate Soares | researcher | — | MIRI Executive Director. Entity exists, no page. |
| 17 | Beth Barnes | researcher | — | Founded METR (Model Evaluation & Threat Research). Entity exists, no page. |
| 16 | Gary Marcus | researcher | — | Prominent AI critic and public commentator. Entity exists, no page. |
| 15 | Ian Hogarth | researcher | — | Chair of UK AI Safety Institute. Entity exists, no page. |
| 14 | Buck Shlegeris | researcher | — | CEO of Redwood Research. Entity exists, no page. |
| 13 | Elizabeth Kelly | researcher | — | Director of US AI Safety Institute. Entity exists, no page. |
| 12 | ARC Evaluations | organization | — | Entity exists (arc-evals), no page. Key eval org. |
| 11 | Redwood Research | organization | — | Entity 'redwood' exists separately from redwood-research page — may need merge or separate page. |
| 10 | Homomorphic Encryption for AI | concept | 1 | Privacy-preserving inference. Niche but growing. |
| 9 | Tokenization | concept | 3 | How text becomes model input. Affects multilingual safety. |
| 8 | Deepfake Detection | response | 3 | Technical countermeasure to deepfakes. Detection arms race. |
| 7 | AI Copyright & Fair Use | concept | 3 | Training data rights, output ownership. Active litigation. |
| 6 | Catastrophic Forgetting | concept | 2 | Models lose capabilities during fine-tuning. Safety implications. |
| 5 | Mixture of Experts | concept | 2 | Architecture used by GPT-4, Mixtral. Efficiency vs. safety. |
| 4 | AI Labor Displacement (Empirical) | metric | 1 | Tracking actual job impacts as of 2026. |
| 3 | Red-Teaming-as-a-Service | response | 1 | Commercial red-teaming offerings and effectiveness. |
| 2 | Continual Learning | concept | 1 | Models that learn after deployment. Safety of ongoing adaptation. |
| 1 | AI Military & Intelligence Applications | concept | 1 | Beyond autonomous weapons — broader military AI use. |