US Executive Order on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy AI
US Executive Order on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy AI
Executive Order 14110 (Oct 2023) established compute thresholds (10^26 FLOP general, 10^23 biological) and created AISI, but was revoked after 15 months with ~85% completion. The 10^26 threshold was never triggered before revocation; GPT-5 estimated at 3×10^25 FLOP remained below it, demonstrating threshold obsolescence concerns. International comparison shows EU AI Act set 10x lower threshold (10^25 FLOP) and cannot be revoked by executive action.
Overview
Executive Order 14110↗🏛️ governmentExecutive Order 14110The Biden Administration's primary AI governance action before being partially revoked by Executive Order 14179 in January 2025; established the compute-threshold reporting framework and US AISI that remain influential in ongoing AI policy debates.President Biden's landmark Executive Order on AI (October 2023) established comprehensive federal policy for AI safety, security, and trustworthiness. It mandated safety evaluat...governancepolicyai-safetycompute+5Source ↗ on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence, signed by President Biden on October 30, 2023, represented the most comprehensive federal response to AI governance in US history. The 111-page directive established mandatory reporting requirements for frontier AI systems, created new oversight institutions, and addressed both immediate risks like algorithmic bias and long-term catastrophic risks from advanced AI capabilities. According to analysis by Stanford HAI, the order placed 150 specific requirements on over 50 federal entities—making it the most detailed AI policy directive ever issued by any government.
The timing was strategically significant: Biden signed the EO one day before the UK's AI Safety Summit at Bletchley Park (November 1-2, 2023), where the US joined 27 other countries in signing the Bletchley Declaration on AI safety. On the same day the EO was released, G7 leaders announced the Hiroshima AI Process Guiding Principles and a voluntary Code of Conduct for organizations developing advanced AI systems, aligning with the EO on red-teaming and content authentication.
The order was revoked by President Trump on January 20, 2025, within hours of his assuming office. The White House stated that EO 14110 "hindered AI innovation and imposed onerous and unnecessary government control over the development of AI." Stanford HAI tracking↗🔗 web★★★★☆Stanford HAIStanford HAI's implementation trackerThis tracker is particularly useful for following U.S. federal AI governance developments, including actions stemming from executive orders relevant to AI safety and compute governance.Stanford HAI's policy tracker monitors the implementation status of U.S. executive actions related to artificial intelligence, including executive orders and directives. It prov...governancepolicyai-safetydeployment+3Source ↗ showed that approximately 85% of the order's 150 distinct requirements had been completed before revocation.
Quick Assessment
| Dimension | Assessment | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Duration | 15 months | Oct 30, 2023 to Jan 20, 2025 |
| Scope | 150+ requirements | Across 50+ federal entities per Stanford HAI |
| Implementation | ≈85% completed | 13/13 management requirements fully implemented per GAO |
| Budget Impact | $10M initial, $47.7M requested | AISI received $10M FY2024; Biden requested +$47.7M for FY2025 |
| Companies Affected | Fewer than 15 | BIS assessment: no more than 15 companies exceeded compute thresholds |
| Enforcement | Weak | No specified penalties; relied on voluntary cooperation |
| Durability | Revoked Day 1 | Executive action vulnerable to administration change |
| Legacy | Partial survival | Final rules (KYC) require formal rulemaking to rescind; AISI → CAISI June 2025 |
For AI safety, the order represented both progress and limitations. It normalized government oversight of frontier AI development and created institutional capacity through the US AI Safety Institute. Yet it primarily focused on transparency and voluntary cooperation rather than mandatory safety requirements or deployment restrictions.
Key Provisions and Mechanisms
Compute-Based Reporting Framework
The order's most innovative feature was its use of computational thresholds to trigger regulatory requirements. Companies training models using more than 10^26 floating-point operations (FLOP) were required to notify the Department of Commerce before and during training, share safety testing results, and provide detailed information about model capabilities, cybersecurity measures, and red-team testing outcomes.
Compute Threshold Comparison
| Threshold | Application | Training Cost Estimate | Models Affected |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10^26 FLOP | General dual-use foundation models | $10-100M per training run↗🔗 web\$10-100M per training runLegal analysis from Morrison Foerster law firm on the binding private-sector obligations in Biden's 2023 AI EO, relevant to compute governance and AI reporting requirements.This Morrison Foerster client alert analyzes Biden's October 2023 AI Executive Order, focusing on its unprecedented direct obligations on private companies to disclose informati...governancepolicycomputedeployment+4Source ↗ | Next-gen frontier models (GPT-5 class) |
| 10^23 FLOP | Biological sequence models | ≈$10-100K per training run | Specialized bio-AI tools |
| 10^20 FLOP/s | Computing cluster capacity threshold | N/A | Large data centers |
| GPT-4 (reference) | Estimated at ≈2 × 10^25 FLOP | ≈$100M | Just under general threshold |
| GPT-5 (reference) | Estimated at ≈3 × 10^25 FLOP | ≈$200M+ | Still below threshold |
| GPT-3 (reference) | 3.14 × 10^23 FLOP | ≈$1M | ≈318x below threshold |
A Biden Administration official stated that "the threshold was set such that current models wouldn't be captured but the next generation state-of-the-art models likely would." The Bureau of Industry and Security assessed↗🔗 webBureau of Industry and Security assessedLegal analysis from Mayer Brown on a 2024 BIS proposed rulemaking requiring AI developers and compute cluster operators to report advanced AI activities to the US government, relevant to AI governance and compute oversight discussions.This Mayer Brown legal analysis covers the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) proposed rule requiring companies to report the development of advanced AI models and large comp...governancepolicycomputecapabilities+3Source ↗ that no more than 15 companies exceeded the reporting thresholds for models and computing clusters.
No model ever triggered the threshold before revocation. Epoch AI estimated GPT-5 pretraining at approximately 3 × 10^25 FLOP—still below the 10^26 threshold. This reflects a shift in frontier AI development: rather than scaling pre-training compute by orders of magnitude, labs increasingly focus on inference-time compute (reasoning models like OpenAI o1) and algorithmic efficiency improvements. xAI's Colossus data center may have approached 10^26 FLOP for some training runs, but this remains unconfirmed.
The separate 10^23 FLOP threshold for biological sequence models reflected concerns that even smaller models could assist in bioweapon development—approximately 1,000 times less compute than the general threshold, acknowledging that biological design capabilities may emerge at lower scales than general intelligence capabilities.
The compute-based approach offered several advantages over capability-based regulations. FLOP measurements are objective and difficult to manipulate, unlike subjective assessments of AI capabilities. The thresholds also provided predictability for developers. However, the static nature of these numbers created risks of obsolescence as algorithmic efficiency improves—researchers estimated↗🔗 webTraining Compute ThresholdsPublished via heim.xyz and tagged with US AISI, this document is relevant to policymakers and researchers interested in how compute-based metrics are used to define regulatory scope for frontier AI models under frameworks like the Biden Executive Order on AI.This document examines the use of training compute thresholds as a governance mechanism for regulating advanced AI systems, analyzing how computational resource requirements can...computegovernancepolicyevaluation+5Source ↗ the thresholds could become outdated within 3-5 years. According to Fenwick analysis, algorithmic improvements of approximately 2-3x per year mean a model that would have required 10^26 FLOP in 2023 might achieve equivalent capabilities with 10^25 FLOP by 2026—rendering static thresholds increasingly ineffective.
Institutional Infrastructure Creation
The order established the US AI Safety Institute (AISI) within the National Institute of Standards and Technology, tasked with developing evaluation methodologies, conducting safety assessments, and coordinating with international partners. Unlike purely advisory bodies, AISI had operational responsibilities including direct testing of frontier models and developing technical standards for the broader AI ecosystem.
AISI Timeline and Development
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Nov 2023 | AISI announced at NIST, one day after EO 14110 signed |
| Feb 2024 | Elizabeth Kelly appointed as director; AISIC consortium created↗🏛️ government★★★★★NISTInternational Network of AI Safety InstitutesThis government fact sheet documents a significant multilateral AI safety governance milestone; relevant for tracking international coordination efforts and the institutionalization of AI safety evaluation across major AI-developing nations.In November 2024, the U.S. Departments of Commerce and State launched the International Network of AI Safety Institutes, uniting ten countries and the EU to advance collaborativ...ai-safetygovernancepolicycoordination+4Source ↗ with 200+ member organizations |
| Mar 2024 | $10M initial budget allocated (vs. $17.7M FY2025 request) |
| May 2024 | NIST Director warns only $1M actually available↗🔗 web★★★☆☆VentureBeat\$1M actually availableRelevant to understanding the practical challenges facing the US AI Safety Institute in its early stages, particularly the gap between its mandated scope and available resources during the Biden-to-Trump transition period.Reports on the Biden administration's appointments to lead the AI Safety Institute (AISI) at NIST, while highlighting concerns about limited available funding (~$1M) for the ins...governancepolicyevaluationai-safety+2Source ↗; "very difficult without additional funding" |
| Aug 2024 | Agreements signed↗🏛️ government★★★★★NISTMOU with US AI Safety InstituteA landmark 2024 government announcement establishing formal pre-deployment model access and safety evaluation collaboration between the U.S. government and leading frontier AI labs, relevant to AI governance and oversight mechanisms.The U.S. AI Safety Institute (NIST) announced Memoranda of Understanding with Anthropic and OpenAI in August 2024, establishing formal frameworks for pre- and post-deployment ac...ai-safetygovernancepolicyevaluation+4Source ↗ with Anthropic and OpenAI for pre-deployment testing |
| Nov 2024 | First joint evaluation with UK AISI: Claude 3.5 Sonnet assessment↗🏛️ government★★★★★NISTPre-deployment evaluation of Claude 3.5 SonnetThis is one of the first publicly disclosed government-conducted pre-deployment AI safety evaluations, setting a precedent for how regulatory bodies may assess frontier models before release; relevant to governance, capability evaluation, and red-teaming methodology discussions.The U.S. and UK AI Safety Institutes jointly conducted pre-deployment safety evaluations of Anthropic's upgraded Claude 3.5 Sonnet, testing biological capabilities, cyber capabi...evaluationred-teaminggovernancepolicy+6Source ↗ |
| Dec 2024 | OpenAI o1 model evaluation↗🏛️ government★★★★★NISTPre-Deployment Evaluation of OpenAI's o1 ModelThis is a landmark government-led safety evaluation representing one of the first formal pre-deployment assessments of a frontier AI model by national safety institutes, relevant to discussions of AI governance frameworks and capability evaluations.The US and UK AI Safety Institutes conducted a joint pre-deployment evaluation of OpenAI's o1 model, assessing its capabilities and risks across three domains including potentia...evaluationcapabilitiesai-safetygovernance+5Source ↗ published |
| Jan 2025 | EO 14110 revoked; AISI future uncertain |
| Feb 2025 | Elizabeth Kelly resigns as director; NIST layoffs announced |
| Jun 2025 | Renamed to Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI); mission refocused from safety to innovation |
AISI's creation paralleled the UK's AI Safety Institute, with the two signing cooperation agreements and developing shared evaluation frameworks. The November 2024 joint evaluation of Claude 3.5 Sonnet↗🏛️ government★★★★☆UK AI Safety InstituteNovember 2024 joint evaluation of Claude 3.5 SonnetThis is a landmark example of formal government pre-deployment AI evaluation, relevant to AI governance discussions about how safety institutes can assess frontier models before public release and coordinate internationally.The UK and US AI Safety Institutes conducted a joint pre-deployment evaluation of Anthropic's upgraded Claude 3.5 Sonnet, assessing biological capabilities, cyber capabilities, ...evaluationred-teamingcapabilitiesgovernance+6Source ↗ tested biological capabilities, cyber capabilities, software/AI development, and safeguard efficacy—representing the first such government-led assessment of a frontier model.
However, AISI faced significant resource constraints. With only $1-10M in actual funding versus the $17.7M requested, and staffing well below the estimated 200+ personnel needed for full capacity, the institute struggled to match the technical sophistication of private AI laboratories.
Global AI Safety Institute Comparison
| Institute | Established | Budget (Annual) | Staff | Key Activities |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US AISI/CAISI | Announced Nov 2023; operational Feb 2024 | $10M (FY24); $6M actual spending | ≈50 estimated | Model evaluation; standards development |
| UK AISI | Nov 2023 | £100M (≈$125M) over 3 years | 100+ | Pre-deployment testing; international coordination |
| Japan AISI | Feb 2024 | ¥2B (≈$13M) initial | ≈30 | Standards research; evaluation frameworks |
| Singapore AISI | Feb 2024 | Not disclosed | ≈20 | Testing frameworks; regional coordination |
| Canada AISI | Nov 2024 | C$50M ($37M) pledged | Not disclosed | Launched Nov 2024 at SF summit |
| EU AI Office | Feb 2024 | Part of EC budget | ≈140 | Regulatory enforcement; standards |
The US AISI's $10M budget contrasts sharply with the UK's £100M commitment. NIST Director Laurie Locascio warned in May 2024 that only $1M was actually available, stating it would be "very, very tough" to continue operations without additional funding.
Leadership Transition and Organizational Uncertainty
Elizabeth Kelly, the inaugural AISI director, resigned on February 6, 2025. In her departure announcement, she stated: "I am confident that AISI's future is bright and its mission remains vital to the future of AI innovation." NIST Director Laurie Locascio also departed at the start of 2025 to head the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). Reports emerged that the Trump administration planned to lay off up to 500 NIST staffers, which posed particular risk for AISI as a new organization where most employees remained on probation.
Cloud Compute Governance
The order introduced "Know Your Customer" (KYC) requirements for Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) providers, mandating that cloud computing companies verify the identity of foreign customers and monitor large training runs. The Bureau of Industry and Security proposed rule↗🔗 webDepartment of Commerce's proposed ruleLegal blog analysis of a U.S. regulatory proposal to require cloud providers to vet foreign AI compute customers, relevant to compute governance and efforts to limit unauthorized access to frontier AI training resources.The U.S. Department of Commerce proposed a rule requiring Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) providers to implement Know Your Customer (KYC) verification for foreign users acces...governancepolicycomputedeployment+2Source ↗ required US IaaS providers to implement Customer Identification Programs (CIP) including:
- Collection of customer name, address, payment source, email, telephone, and IP addresses
- Verification of whether beneficial owners are US persons
- Reporting to Commerce when foreign customers train large AI models with potential malicious applications
- Violations subject to civil and criminal penalties under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
These requirements reflected recognition that compute infrastructure represents a chokepoint in AI development that the US can potentially control. By leveraging American companies' dominance in cloud computing, the order extended US regulatory reach to foreign AI developers who rely on American infrastructure—complementing export controls on AI chips.
Diagram (loading…)
flowchart TD
subgraph EO14110["Executive Order 14110 Framework"]
COMPUTE[Compute Thresholds<br/>10^26 FLOP general<br/>10^23 FLOP biological] --> REPORT[Mandatory Reporting<br/>to Commerce Dept]
REPORT --> AISI[US AI Safety Institute<br/>Pre-deployment Testing]
CLOUD[Cloud KYC Requirements<br/>IaaS Providers] --> FOREIGN[Foreign Customer<br/>Identification]
FOREIGN --> MONITOR[Training Run<br/>Monitoring]
end
subgraph REVOCATION["Trump Administration (Jan 2025)"]
REVOKE[EO 14110 Revoked] --> REVIEW[Agency Review<br/>of All Actions]
REVIEW --> CAISI[AISI → CAISI<br/>Safety → Innovation Focus]
REVIEW --> UNCERTAIN[Status of KYC Rules<br/>Uncertain]
end
EO14110 --> REVOCATION
style COMPUTE fill:#e1f5fe
style AISI fill:#e1f5fe
style REVOKE fill:#ffcdd2
style CAISI fill:#fff3e0The practical implementation faced several challenges. Defining "large training runs" in real-time requires technical sophistication from cloud providers, who must distinguish AI training from other compute-intensive applications. Moreover, determined adversaries might circumvent these requirements by using non-US cloud providers or developing domestic computing capabilities.
Broader Policy Scope
While the compute thresholds and AISI attracted the most attention, the order addressed AI governance across eight policy areas. Several provisions addressed immediate, non-frontier risks:
| Policy Area | Key Requirements | Lead Agencies | Deadline | Status at Revocation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Civil Rights & Bias | Guidance to prevent AI discrimination in housing, benefits, hiring; DOJ coordination on civil rights enforcement | DOJ, HUD, EEOC | 180 days | Guidance issued |
| Healthcare | AI safety program for harm reporting; quality control strategy for AI-enabled medical devices | HHS | 180 days | Framework published |
| Immigration & Talent | Streamlined visa processing for AI researchers; modernized O-1A, EB-1A, EB-2 pathways; updated Schedule A occupations | State, DHS, DOL | 45-180 days | Largely completed |
| Consumer Protection | Encouraged FTC/CFPB to apply existing consumer protection laws to AI; directed new safeguards against AI-related fraud | FTC, CFPB | Ongoing | Some actions taken |
| Government Modernization | Each agency to designate a Chief AI Officer; risk-based approach to generative AI use | OMB, all agencies | 60 days | 13/13 fully implemented |
| Innovation & Competition | NSF to launch NAIRR pilot program↗🏛️ governmentExecutive Order 14110The Biden Administration's primary AI governance action before being partially revoked by Executive Order 14179 in January 2025; established the compute-threshold reporting framework and US AISI that remain influential in ongoing AI policy debates.President Biden's landmark Executive Order on AI (October 2023) established comprehensive federal policy for AI safety, security, and trustworthiness. It mandated safety evaluat...governancepolicyai-safetycompute+5Source ↗ within 90 days; measures to attract AI talent | NSF | 90 days | Pilot launched |
The government modernization provisions had notably high completion rates. OMB issued guidance M-24-10 defining "rights-impacting" and "safety-impacting" AI categories—terminology that mirrored the EU AI Act's "high-risk" framework—and all 24 CFO Act agencies designated Chief AI Officers by the deadline. These institutional changes largely survived the revocation, as agencies retained their AI leadership structures at their own discretion.
Legal Basis and Enforcement Authority
The order relied on two key legal authorities for its mandatory provisions. The Defense Production Act↗🏛️ governmentExecutive Order 14110The Biden Administration's primary AI governance action before being partially revoked by Executive Order 14179 in January 2025; established the compute-threshold reporting framework and US AISI that remain influential in ongoing AI policy debates.President Biden's landmark Executive Order on AI (October 2023) established comprehensive federal policy for AI safety, security, and trustworthiness. It mandated safety evaluat...governancepolicyai-safetycompute+5Source ↗ (DPA) was invoked to compel reporting from companies developing dual-use foundation models above the compute thresholds—an expansive application of Cold War-era industrial mobilization law to commercial AI development. Some legal scholars questioned whether the DPA could legitimately be used for information-gathering rather than production mandates. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) underpinned the KYC requirements for cloud providers, enabling civil and criminal penalties for violations.
However, the order included no new enforcement mechanisms for most provisions. The BIS proposed rule on developer reporting requirements—published September 2024 with a comment period closing October 11, 2024—was never finalized before revocation, meaning the compute-based reporting regime never achieved full regulatory force. This gap between the order's sweeping scope and its limited enforcement authority was a recurring criticism.
Safety Implications and Risk Assessment
Promising Aspects for AI Safety
The order's most significant safety contribution is establishing the principle that frontier AI development requires government oversight. By creating mandatory reporting requirements and institutional evaluation capacity, it moves beyond purely voluntary industry commitments toward structured accountability. The compute-based thresholds provide objective criteria that avoid subjective judgments about AI capabilities while capturing systems of genuine concern.
The institutional infrastructure created by the order builds long-term capacity for AI governance that could prove crucial as capabilities advance. AISI's technical expertise and evaluation methodologies may become essential tools for assessing increasingly powerful systems. The institute's international coordination role also creates foundations for global governance frameworks that could address catastrophic risks requiring multilateral cooperation.
The order's breadth across multiple risk categories—from algorithmic bias to national security threats—reflects sophisticated understanding of AI's diverse impact pathways. By addressing both immediate harms and long-term risks simultaneously, it avoids the false dichotomy between near-term and existential AI safety concerns. The integration of fairness, security, and catastrophic risk considerations within a single framework could prove influential for future governance approaches.
Concerning Limitations
Despite its comprehensive scope, the order lacks mechanisms to actually prevent the development or deployment of dangerous AI systems. The reporting requirements provide visibility but not control, and the order includes no authority to pause training runs or restrict model releases based on safety concerns. This represents a fundamental limitation for addressing catastrophic risks that might emerge from future AI systems.
The voluntary nature of many provisions weakens the order's potential effectiveness. While reporting requirements are mandatory, many safety-related provisions rely on industry cooperation rather than enforceable mandates. Companies that choose not to comply face unclear consequences, undermining the order's credibility as a regulatory framework. The absence of specified penalties or enforcement mechanisms reflects the limited authority available through executive action.
The order's durability remains highly uncertain given its status as executive action rather than legislation. Future administrations could modify or revoke its provisions entirely, creating regulatory uncertainty that might discourage long-term compliance investments. This political fragility represents a significant weakness for addressing long-term AI risks that require sustained governance approaches spanning multiple electoral cycles.
International Comparison of AI Compute Thresholds
| Jurisdiction | Threshold | Scope | Obligations | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US EO 14110 | 10^26 FLOP | General dual-use models | Report to Commerce; share red-team results | Revoked Jan 2025 |
| US EO 14110 | 10^23 FLOP | Biological sequence models | Same as above | Revoked Jan 2025 |
| EU AI Act | 10^25 FLOP | GPAI with systemic risk | Registration; model evaluation; incident reporting | In force Aug 2025 |
| UK (voluntary) | None specified | Frontier models | Voluntary pre-deployment testing with UK AISI | Active |
| China (proposed) | Not compute-based | Foundation models serving public | Registration; security assessment; content moderation | Partial implementation |
The EU AI Act sets a 10x lower threshold (10^25 vs 10^26 FLOP) than the US EO did, meaning more models face regulatory obligations in Europe. The US threshold was intentionally set high—a Biden Administration official stated it was designed so "current models wouldn't be captured but the next generation state-of-the-art models likely would."
Revocation and Aftermath
Trump Administration Response
On January 20, 2025, President Trump revoked Executive Order 14110 within hours of assuming office. The White House fact sheet stated↗🔗 webThe Changing Landscape of AI: Federal Guidance for Employers Reverses Course Under New AdministrationRelevant to AI governance practitioners tracking U.S. federal AI policy evolution, particularly the shift from Biden-era AI executive orders to Trump administration reversals affecting employer obligations around AI use.This article examines how federal AI guidance affecting employers has shifted under a new administration, likely referring to the reversal of Biden-era AI executive orders and f...governancepolicydeploymentai-safety+1Source ↗ that the order "hindered AI innovation and imposed onerous and unnecessary government control over the development of AI."
Policy Paradigm Comparison
| Dimension | Biden EO 14110 | Trump EO 14179 & Subsequent Orders |
|---|---|---|
| Primary framing | Safety and trustworthiness | Innovation and competitiveness |
| Government role | Active oversight and evaluation | Remove barriers; minimize intervention |
| Compute thresholds | 10^26 FLOP triggers mandatory reporting | Revoked; no federal thresholds |
| AISI/CAISI mission | Pre-deployment safety testing | Innovation promotion; national security focus |
| State regulation | Neutral; states develop own frameworks | Aggressive preemption via DOJ litigation |
| International stance | Multilateral safety cooperation | Competitive advantage; refused Paris communique |
| Industry relationship | Mandatory reporting + voluntary testing agreements | Voluntary engagement; "pro-growth" emphasis |
Three days later, on January 23, 2025, Trump signed Executive Order 14179↗🏛️ governmentExecutive Order 14179This executive order represents a major policy reversal in U.S. AI governance, directly affecting institutions and frameworks relevant to AI safety, including the AISI and compute-threshold reporting regimes established under the prior administration.Signed by President Trump in January 2025, this executive order revokes Biden-era AI safety mandates (including EO 14110) and reorients U.S. AI policy toward promoting innovatio...governancepolicyai-safetydeployment+3Source ↗, "Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence," which:
- Directed agencies to identify and revise/rescind all EO 14110 actions "inconsistent with enhancing America's leadership in AI"
- Mandated development of an "action plan" within 180 days to "sustain and enhance America's global AI dominance"
- Explicitly framed AI development as a matter of national competitiveness over safety
- Required OMB to revise memoranda M-24-10 and M-24-18 within 60 days
Vice President Vance subsequently stated that "pro-growth AI policies" should be prioritized over safety↗📖 reference★★★☆☆WikipediaUK AI Safety Institute WikipediaUseful background reference for understanding the UK's institutional AI safety efforts; relevant to discussions of AI governance, evaluation frameworks, and international policy coordination.Wikipedia article covering the UK AI Safety Institute (AISI), a government body established in 2023 to advance AI safety research and evaluation. It provides an overview of the ...ai-safetygovernancepolicyevaluation+4Source ↗, and the US refused to sign the February 2025 AI Action Summit communique in Paris.
What Survived the Revocation
The revocation did not automatically repeal everything implemented under EO 14110. Legal analysis↗🔗 webSkadden Legal Analysis: Biden AI Executive Order WithdrawalSkadden legal analysis relevant to understanding the regulatory implications of the Biden AI EO withdrawal, particularly for compute governance and the US AISI's future role.Skadden law firm provides legal analysis of the withdrawal of President Biden's broad AI executive order, examining the implications for AI governance, compute thresholds, and t...governancepolicycomputedeployment+3Source ↗ indicates:
| Category | Status | Uncertainty |
|---|---|---|
| Completed agency actions | Remain unless specifically reversed | High—under review |
| Final rules (e.g., IaaS KYC) | Require formal rulemaking to rescind | Medium |
| Voluntary industry agreements | Continue unless parties withdraw | Low |
| AISI evaluations completed | Published; cannot be "unreviewed" | None |
| International agreements | Continue; diplomatic relations independent | Low |
| Chief AI Officer designations | Remain at agency discretion | Medium |
The Commerce Department's Framework for AI Diffusion↗🔗 webCommerce Department's Framework for AI DiffusionThis legal alert from Wiley Law covers the immediate policy implications of Trump revoking Biden's central AI executive order, relevant for tracking the evolution of US federal AI governance and regulatory landscape in 2025.On January 20, 2025, President Trump revoked Biden's landmark 2023 AI Executive Order (EO 14110) as part of a broader rescission of Biden-era actions. The article analyzes the i...governancepolicydeploymentai-safety+2Source ↗ and other final rules may require separate rulemaking processes to revoke, providing some continuity even as the overall framework shifts.
AISI to CAISI Transformation
In June 2025, the US AI Safety Institute was renamed to the Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI) with a fundamentally different mission. According to Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick: "For far too long, censorship and regulations have been used under the guise of national security. Innovators will no longer be limited by these standards. CAISI will evaluate and enhance US innovation of these rapidly developing commercial AI systems while ensuring they remain secure to our national security standards."
This represents a shift from:
- Safety evaluation → Innovation promotion
- Pre-deployment risk assessment → National security focus
- International safety coordination → Competitive advantage emphasis
The December 2025 NIST announcement of $10M in AI centers↗🔗 webNIST and MITRE Announce $20M Research Effort on AI CybersecurityCovers a U.S. government-funded initiative to strengthen AI cybersecurity research, relevant to those tracking federal AI safety policy and institutional efforts to address AI-specific security risks.NIST and MITRE announced a $20 million collaborative research initiative focused on AI cybersecurity, aiming to develop standards, tools, and frameworks to address AI-related se...governancepolicyai-safetyevaluation+3Source ↗ (with MITRE) and a planned $10M AI for Resilient Manufacturing Institute suggests resources are being redirected toward manufacturing and cybersecurity applications rather than frontier model safety evaluation.
Trump AI Action Plan (July 2025)
On July 23, 2025, the White House OSTP released "Winning the Race: America's AI Action Plan," outlining 90 federal policy positions across three pillars: accelerating innovation, building American AI infrastructure, and leading in international diplomacy and security. The plan was developed in response to EO 14179's mandate for a 180-day action plan and incorporated over 10,000 public comments.
The plan takes a deregulatory stance, directing OMB to identify and repeal regulations that hinder AI development. It emphasizes national security applications and competitive positioning against China rather than the safety-testing framework of EO 14110. CAISI's role under the plan focuses on cybersecurity, biosecurity, chemical weapons, and countering foreign adversarial influence—areas that align with national defense priorities rather than the broad consumer protection and civil rights mandate of EO 14110.
State Law Preemption Order (December 2025)
On December 11, 2025, President Trump signed a new executive order titled "Ensuring a National Policy Framework for Artificial Intelligence," which directly targets state-level AI regulation. This order represents a significant expansion of federal AI policy beyond simply revoking Biden-era rules.
| Provision | Mechanism | Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| AI Litigation Task Force | DOJ to sue states over AI laws deemed to obstruct federal policy | Immediate |
| Commerce Department evaluation | Identify "onerous" state AI laws for DOJ referral | 90 days |
| FTC policy statement | Clarify FTC Act preemption of state AI disclosure requirements | 90 days |
| Federal funding leverage | Study withholding rural broadband funding from states with unfavorable AI laws | Under review |
| Legislative recommendation | Prepare proposal for uniform federal AI framework | Ongoing |
The order explicitly targets the Colorado AI Act, claiming it "may even force AI models to produce false results in order to avoid a 'differential treatment or impact' on protected groups." At minimum, Commerce must identify state laws requiring AI models to alter "truthful outputs" or compel disclosures "that would violate the First Amendment."
Legal analysts note the executive order cannot itself preempt state law—only Congress or the courts can do so. Until legal challenges are resolved, state AI laws remain enforceable. The order functions as a "pressure-and-positioning instrument" to narrow the practical space for state AI regulation rather than an immediate legal override.
US AI Governance Timeline (2023-2025)
Diagram (loading…)
timeline
title Evolution of US Federal AI Policy
section Biden Era
Oct 2023 : EO 14110 signed
: 150+ requirements
: Compute thresholds set
Nov 2023 : AISI founded at NIST
Feb 2024 : Elizabeth Kelly named director
: AISIC consortium formed
Aug 2024 : Anthropic/OpenAI testing agreements
Nov 2024 : Joint US-UK model evaluation
: International Safety Network launched
section Trump Era
Jan 2025 : EO 14110 revoked
: EO 14179 signed
Feb 2025 : Kelly resigns
: NIST layoffs announced
: Paris communique refused
Jun 2025 : AISI renamed CAISI
: Mission pivots to innovation
Jul 2025 : AI Action Plan released
: 90 policy positions
Dec 2025 : State preemption EO
: DOJ AI Litigation Task ForceImplementation Progress (Pre-Revocation)
Completed Actions (Oct 2023 - Jan 2025)
Stanford HAI's tracker↗🔗 web★★★★☆Stanford HAIStanford HAI's implementation trackerThis tracker is particularly useful for following U.S. federal AI governance developments, including actions stemming from executive orders relevant to AI safety and compute governance.Stanford HAI's policy tracker monitors the implementation status of U.S. executive actions related to artificial intelligence, including executive orders and directives. It prov...governancepolicyai-safetydeployment+3Source ↗ documented approximately 85% completion of the order's 150 distinct requirements before revocation:
| Policy Area | Requirements | Completion Rate | Key Actions |
|---|---|---|---|
| AI Safety & Security | ≈25 | High | AISI created; evaluation agreements signed |
| Civil Rights & Bias | ≈20 | High | Agency guidance issued |
| Consumer Protection | ≈15 | Medium | Standards development ongoing |
| Labor & Workforce | ≈15 | Medium | Reports published |
| Innovation & Competition | ≈20 | High | Research initiatives launched |
| Government Modernization | ≈30 | High | Chief AI Officers designated |
| International Cooperation | ≈15 | High | UK AISI partnership; international network launched |
| Emerging Threats | ≈10 | Medium | Biosecurity framework under development |
Key Accomplishments
Despite its short duration, the order achieved several notable outcomes:
Model Evaluation Precedent: The joint US-UK evaluation of Claude 3.5 Sonnet↗🏛️ government★★★★★NISTPre-deployment evaluation of Claude 3.5 SonnetThis is one of the first publicly disclosed government-conducted pre-deployment AI safety evaluations, setting a precedent for how regulatory bodies may assess frontier models before release; relevant to governance, capability evaluation, and red-teaming methodology discussions.The U.S. and UK AI Safety Institutes jointly conducted pre-deployment safety evaluations of Anthropic's upgraded Claude 3.5 Sonnet, testing biological capabilities, cyber capabi...evaluationred-teaminggovernancepolicy+6Source ↗ and OpenAI o1↗🏛️ government★★★★★NISTPre-Deployment Evaluation of OpenAI's o1 ModelThis is a landmark government-led safety evaluation representing one of the first formal pre-deployment assessments of a frontier AI model by national safety institutes, relevant to discussions of AI governance frameworks and capability evaluations.The US and UK AI Safety Institutes conducted a joint pre-deployment evaluation of OpenAI's o1 model, assessing its capabilities and risks across three domains including potentia...evaluationcapabilitiesai-safetygovernance+5Source ↗ established government capacity for pre-deployment testing of frontier models—the first such government-led assessments anywhere. The o1 evaluation notably found the model "solved an additional three cryptography-related challenges that no other model completed."
International Network: In November 2024, the US launched the International Network of AI Safety Institutes↗🏛️ government★★★★★NISTInternational Network of AI Safety InstitutesThis government fact sheet documents a significant multilateral AI safety governance milestone; relevant for tracking international coordination efforts and the institutionalization of AI safety evaluation across major AI-developing nations.In November 2024, the U.S. Departments of Commerce and State launched the International Network of AI Safety Institutes, uniting ten countries and the EU to advance collaborativ...ai-safetygovernancepolicycoordination+4Source ↗, establishing formal cooperation with the UK, Canada, Japan, Singapore, and other allies on AI safety research.
Industry Cooperation: Voluntary agreements with Anthropic and OpenAI demonstrated that frontier AI companies would accept government access to pre-release models—a precedent that may persist even after revocation.
Expert and Public Reactions
The order received broadly positive reactions from AI governance researchers and Democratic lawmakers. Stanford HAI experts characterized it as "a good start" but cautioned it was "not enough" without congressional legislation. Representative Don Beyer called it a "comprehensive strategy for responsible innovation." Polling from the AI Policy Institute found 69% of voters supported the EO, including 64% of Republicans.
Critics focused on two concerns. Senator Ted Cruz described it as creating "barriers to innovation disguised as safety measures." Some legal scholars questioned whether the Defense Production Act could legitimately compel disclosures from AI companies, arguing the statute was designed for industrial production requirements rather than information-gathering mandates.
The revocation generated a different debate. Legal analysts from firms including Skadden and Wiley noted that rescinding the order created significant regulatory uncertainty, since many agency actions taken under EO 14110 were already in effect and their post-revocation legal status was unclear.
Key Uncertainties and Future Outlook
The Broader 2024-2025 Regulatory Landscape
The EO 14110 revocation occurred within a rapidly evolving AI policy environment:
| Level | 2023 | 2024 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Federal AI regulations | 25 | 59 | +136% |
| Agencies issuing regulations | 21 | 42 | +100% |
| State AI bills proposed | ≈300 | 629 | +110% |
| State AI bills passed | ≈50 | 131 | +162% |
| Congressional AI bills proposed | ≈100 | 211 | +111% |
| Congressional AI bills passed | 1 | 4 | +300% (from low base) |
| Prior EO compliance (agencies filing inventories) | 53% | Improved | EO drove compliance |
This landscape reveals a core tension: while federal AI governance has fragmented following the EO revocation, state-level activity has accelerated dramatically—a 110% increase in bills proposed and 162% increase in bills passed year-over-year. The December 2025 state preemption order represents an attempt to address this fragmentation by federal assertion rather than federal legislation. According to the Stanford HAI 2025 AI Index, despite receiving over 10,000 public comments on the AI Action Plan, Congress has not passed major AI legislation since the initial AI in Government Act of 2020.
What Happens Next?
With EO 14110 revoked and AISI transformed into CAISI, several key questions remain:
| Question | Optimistic Scenario | Pessimistic Scenario | Current Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Will voluntary industry agreements continue? | Labs maintain AISI relationships independently | Labs reduce cooperation without mandate | Medium uncertainty—depends on lab incentives |
| Will international coordination survive? | UK/EU/allies continue; US rejoins later | US isolation undermines global frameworks | Medium-high—US refused to sign Paris communique |
| Will Congress legislate AI safety? | Bipartisan legislation codifies key provisions | No legislation; state patchwork emerges | High uncertainty—no major bills advancing |
| Will compute thresholds become obsolete? | Future frameworks adopt capability-based triggers | No governance framework adapts | High—3-5 year threshold for obsolescence |
| Will frontier labs face any oversight? | Industry self-governance; state regulations | No meaningful oversight until incident | Medium-high—depends on state action and incidents |
Lessons for AI Governance
The EO 14110 experience offers several lessons for future AI governance efforts:
Executive action fragility: The complete revocation within 15 months demonstrates that executive orders cannot provide durable AI governance. Of the approximately 150 requirements in EO 14110, roughly 85% were completed before revocation—yet all this implementation effort could be unwound by a single signature. Any sustainable framework requires congressional legislation or deeply embedded institutional practices that survive administration changes. For comparison, the EU AI Act took 3 years to negotiate but cannot be revoked by a single executive; modification requires parliamentary supermajorities.
Compute thresholds have a shelf life: The 10^26 FLOP threshold, designed to capture "next-generation" models, was never actually triggered before revocation. Researchers estimate↗🔗 webFenwick: Interesting Developments for Regulatory Thresholds of AI ComputeA law firm analysis relevant to AI governance practitioners tracking how compute-based regulatory thresholds are being developed; useful for understanding the legal landscape around frontier AI model oversight.A legal analysis from Fenwick examining evolving regulatory frameworks that use computational thresholds (e.g., FLOP counts) to define which AI systems trigger oversight require...governancepolicycomputeregulation+4Source ↗ such thresholds become outdated within 3-5 years as algorithmic efficiency improves.
Voluntary cooperation is necessary but insufficient: The Anthropic and OpenAI agreements demonstrated frontier labs will cooperate with government oversight—but this cooperation was voluntary and contingent on political conditions that no longer exist.
International coordination requires US participation: The International Network of AI Safety Institutes↗🏛️ government★★★★★NISTInternational Network of AI Safety InstitutesThis government fact sheet documents a significant multilateral AI safety governance milestone; relevant for tracking international coordination efforts and the institutionalization of AI safety evaluation across major AI-developing nations.In November 2024, the U.S. Departments of Commerce and State launched the International Network of AI Safety Institutes, uniting ten countries and the EU to advance collaborativ...ai-safetygovernancepolicycoordination+4Source ↗ launched just months before the US pivot away from safety-focused governance. Without sustained US engagement, international safety coordination faces significant headwinds.
Sources
Primary Sources
- Executive Order 14110 (Federal Register)↗🏛️ governmentExecutive Order 14110The Biden Administration's primary AI governance action before being partially revoked by Executive Order 14179 in January 2025; established the compute-threshold reporting framework and US AISI that remain influential in ongoing AI policy debates.President Biden's landmark Executive Order on AI (October 2023) established comprehensive federal policy for AI safety, security, and trustworthiness. It mandated safety evaluat...governancepolicyai-safetycompute+5Source ↗ - Full text of Biden order
- Executive Order 14179 (Federal Register)↗🏛️ governmentExecutive Order 14179This executive order represents a major policy reversal in U.S. AI governance, directly affecting institutions and frameworks relevant to AI safety, including the AISI and compute-threshold reporting regimes established under the prior administration.Signed by President Trump in January 2025, this executive order revokes Biden-era AI safety mandates (including EO 14110) and reorients U.S. AI policy toward promoting innovatio...governancepolicyai-safetydeployment+3Source ↗ - Trump replacement order
- Executive Order on State Law Preemption (White House) - December 2025 state preemption order
- Commerce Secretary Statement on CAISI - AISI transformation announcement
Implementation Tracking
- Stanford HAI Executive Action Tracker↗🔗 web★★★★☆Stanford HAIStanford HAI's implementation trackerThis tracker is particularly useful for following U.S. federal AI governance developments, including actions stemming from executive orders relevant to AI safety and compute governance.Stanford HAI's policy tracker monitors the implementation status of U.S. executive actions related to artificial intelligence, including executive orders and directives. It prov...governancepolicyai-safetydeployment+3Source ↗ - Implementation progress monitoring
- Stanford HAI AI Index 2025 - Policy landscape analysis
- NIST AI Safety Institute↗🏛️ government★★★★★NISTNIST AI Safety InstituteThis NIST page documents the now-rescinded Biden-era EO 14110, a landmark U.S. federal AI safety policy that created NIST's AI Safety Institute; its rescission in January 2025 reflects ongoing policy volatility in U.S. AI governance.This NIST page covers the Biden Administration's Executive Order 14110 on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence, issued October 30, 2023. The EO directed NIST an...ai-safetygovernancepolicyevaluation+3Source ↗ - AISI resources and evaluations
Analysis
- Georgetown CSET Analysis↗🔗 web★★★★☆CSET GeorgetownGeorgetown CSET AnalysisCSET (Center for Security and Emerging Technology) at Georgetown provides policy-focused analysis; this piece is relevant for understanding US federal AI governance shifts, particularly regarding deregulation and its impact on AI safety oversight structures like the US AISI.Georgetown CSET analyzes the executive order focused on advancing American AI leadership by reducing regulatory barriers, examining implications for AI governance, safety standa...governancepolicyai-safetycompute+3Source ↗ - Policy analysis of the revocation
- Congress.gov CRS Report↗🏛️ government★★★★★US CongressCongress.gov CRS ReportThis CRS report is a key reference for U.S. federal AI policy; note that EO 14110 was revoked by the Trump Administration in January 2025, making this primarily a historical document for understanding the Biden-era AI governance framework.This Congressional Research Service report summarizes Biden's Executive Order 14110 on AI, issued October 30, 2023, covering eight major policy areas including AI safety, civil ...governancepolicyai-safetydeployment+4Source ↗ - Congressional Research Service analysis
- TechPolicy.Press Analysis - AISI to CAISI renaming implications
- Epoch AI Notes on GPT-5 Compute - Compute threshold analysis
- Gibson Dunn State Preemption Analysis - Legal analysis of December 2025 order
- Skadden: AI Broad Biden Order Withdrawn - Post-revocation legal analysis
- Wiley: Trump Revokes Biden AI EO - Regulatory uncertainty analysis
References
A legal analysis from Fenwick examining evolving regulatory frameworks that use computational thresholds (e.g., FLOP counts) to define which AI systems trigger oversight requirements. The piece reviews key policy developments at state and federal levels relevant to frontier AI governance.
This Morrison Foerster client alert analyzes Biden's October 2023 AI Executive Order, focusing on its unprecedented direct obligations on private companies to disclose information about powerful AI models (trained with >10^26 FLOPs) and computing clusters to the federal government. It examines the legal basis for these compelled disclosures under the Defense Production Act and the scope of covered models and clusters.
This NIST page covers the Biden Administration's Executive Order 14110 on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence, issued October 30, 2023. The EO directed NIST and other agencies to develop AI safety standards, guidelines, and evaluation tools. The order was rescinded on January 20, 2025, under the incoming Trump administration.
The U.S. AI Safety Institute (NIST) announced Memoranda of Understanding with Anthropic and OpenAI in August 2024, establishing formal frameworks for pre- and post-deployment access to major AI models. These agreements enable collaborative research on capability evaluations, safety risk assessment, and mitigation methods, representing the first formal government-industry partnerships of this kind in the U.S.
On January 20, 2025, President Trump revoked Biden's landmark 2023 AI Executive Order (EO 14110) as part of a broader rescission of Biden-era actions. The article analyzes the implications for federal AI governance efforts launched under the Biden EO, including OMB guidance on AI risk management and acquisition, and notes that not all Biden AI initiatives were rolled back.
This Congressional Research Service report summarizes Biden's Executive Order 14110 on AI, issued October 30, 2023, covering eight major policy areas including AI safety, civil rights, and federal AI governance. It details agency mandates and timelines, serving as a reference for Congress to understand the administration's AI governance framework. The report is a key document for understanding U.S. federal AI policy as of late 2023.
President Biden's landmark Executive Order on AI (October 2023) established comprehensive federal policy for AI safety, security, and trustworthiness. It mandated safety evaluations for frontier AI models, created reporting requirements for large-scale AI training runs, and directed agencies across the federal government to develop AI governance frameworks and standards.
Wikipedia article covering the UK AI Safety Institute (AISI), a government body established in 2023 to advance AI safety research and evaluation. It provides an overview of the institute's mission, structure, key activities such as frontier model evaluations, and its role in international AI safety coordination. The article serves as a reference point for understanding the UK's institutional approach to governing advanced AI.
Reports on the Biden administration's appointments to lead the AI Safety Institute (AISI) at NIST, while highlighting concerns about limited available funding (~$1M) for the institute's operations. The piece covers the tension between political momentum for AI safety governance and practical resource constraints facing the newly established body.
The U.S. and UK AI Safety Institutes jointly conducted pre-deployment safety evaluations of Anthropic's upgraded Claude 3.5 Sonnet, testing biological capabilities, cyber capabilities, software/AI development, and safeguard efficacy. The evaluation used question answering, agent tasks, qualitative probing, and red teaming to benchmark the model against prior versions and competitors. This represents one of the first formal government-led pre-deployment AI safety evaluations made public.
Skadden law firm provides legal analysis of the withdrawal of President Biden's broad AI executive order, examining the implications for AI governance, compute thresholds, and the US AI Safety Institute. The piece covers how the rescission affects existing regulatory frameworks and what it signals for future AI policy direction under the new administration.
In November 2024, the U.S. Departments of Commerce and State launched the International Network of AI Safety Institutes, uniting ten countries and the EU to advance collaborative AI safety science, share best practices, and coordinate evaluation methodologies. The inaugural San Francisco convening produced a joint mission statement, multilateral testing findings, and over $11 million in synthetic content research funding. The initiative aims to build global scientific consensus on safe AI development while preventing fragmented international governance.
This document examines the use of training compute thresholds as a governance mechanism for regulating advanced AI systems, analyzing how computational resource requirements can serve as proxies for identifying potentially dangerous AI models. It likely addresses methodological considerations for setting appropriate thresholds and their role in AI safety policy frameworks, particularly in the context of US AI Safety Institute initiatives.
Stanford HAI's policy tracker monitors the implementation status of U.S. executive actions related to artificial intelligence, including executive orders and directives. It provides a structured overview of which AI-related federal mandates have been fulfilled, are in progress, or remain pending. This serves as a reference tool for researchers and policymakers tracking the regulatory landscape.
Signed by President Trump in January 2025, this executive order revokes Biden-era AI safety mandates (including EO 14110) and reorients U.S. AI policy toward promoting innovation, economic competitiveness, and minimizing regulatory burdens. It directs agencies to review and rescind rules seen as impeding AI development and instructs the development of a new national AI action plan prioritizing American dominance in AI.
This Mayer Brown legal analysis covers the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) proposed rule requiring companies to report the development of advanced AI models and large compute clusters to the US government. The proposal aims to enhance federal oversight of frontier AI development by mandating transparency about capabilities and infrastructure. It represents a significant regulatory step toward monitoring AI progress at the hardware and model level.
The US and UK AI Safety Institutes conducted a joint pre-deployment evaluation of OpenAI's o1 model, assessing its capabilities and risks across three domains including potential for misuse. The evaluation compared o1's performance to reference models and represents an early example of government-led frontier AI safety testing prior to public release.
NIST and MITRE announced a $20 million collaborative research initiative focused on AI cybersecurity, aiming to develop standards, tools, and frameworks to address AI-related security vulnerabilities. The effort reflects growing U.S. government recognition that AI systems introduce novel cybersecurity risks requiring dedicated research infrastructure. This initiative is part of broader federal efforts to ensure AI safety and security through institutional partnerships.
The U.S. Department of Commerce proposed a rule requiring Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) providers to implement Know Your Customer (KYC) verification for foreign users accessing cloud computing resources above certain thresholds. The rule aims to prevent adversarial actors from using U.S. cloud infrastructure to train advanced AI models. This legal analysis covers the regulatory implications for cloud providers and the AI industry.
This article examines how federal AI guidance affecting employers has shifted under a new administration, likely referring to the reversal of Biden-era AI executive orders and fact sheets by the Trump administration. It covers practical implications for employers navigating evolving federal AI policy and workplace regulations.
Georgetown CSET analyzes the executive order focused on advancing American AI leadership by reducing regulatory barriers, examining implications for AI governance, safety standards, and the balance between innovation and oversight. The analysis likely evaluates how deregulatory approaches affect compute thresholds, AI safety institutions, and federal AI policy frameworks.
The UK and US AI Safety Institutes conducted a joint pre-deployment evaluation of Anthropic's upgraded Claude 3.5 Sonnet, assessing biological capabilities, cyber capabilities, software/AI development, and safeguard efficacy. The evaluation used multiple methodologies including red teaming and agent tasks, benchmarking against prior Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o, and o1-preview. This represents an early example of government-led pre-deployment safety testing of frontier AI models.
The GAO assessed federal agency compliance with 13 AI management and talent requirements from Executive Order 14110 (October 2023), finding all requirements with March 2024 deadlines were fully implemented by agencies including OMB, OPM, and GSA. Key implementations included establishing the White House AI Council, Chief AI Officer councils, AI talent recruitment plans, and government-wide AI guidance. This represents foundational infrastructure for coordinated federal AI governance.
The EU AI Act is the world's first comprehensive legal framework for artificial intelligence, establishing risk-based regulations for AI systems deployed in the European Union. It categorizes AI into unacceptable risk, high-risk, limited risk, and minimal risk tiers, with corresponding obligations for transparency, safety, and conformity assessment. It also introduces specific rules for general-purpose AI models, including those with systemic risk.
The U.S. Commerce Department announced the renaming and restructuring of the AI Safety Institute into the Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI) under Secretary Howard Lutnick. The shift explicitly reframes the mission away from safety-oriented regulation toward pro-innovation voluntary standards, while retaining national security evaluation functions focused on demonstrable risks like cybersecurity and biosecurity. This represents a significant policy realignment in the U.S. government's approach to AI oversight.
The Stanford HAI 2025 AI Index Report's policy chapter tracks the rapid growth of AI-related legislation, national government AI investment strategies, and emerging international frameworks for AI safety collaboration. It provides empirical data on how governments worldwide are responding to AI development through regulatory and institutional mechanisms.
This White House executive action establishes a federal preemption framework for AI policy, aiming to eliminate conflicting state-level AI regulations in favor of a unified national approach. It asserts federal supremacy over AI governance to prevent a patchwork of state laws that could obstruct national AI development and deployment priorities. The order reflects the administration's intent to accelerate AI adoption by reducing regulatory fragmentation.